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ABSTRACT 
With the American economy seemingly stalling, the global 
economy thereby imperiled, and another electoral campaign 
season well underway in the United States, the “outsourcing” of 
jobs from the developed to the developing world is again on the 
public agenda.  Latest figures indicate not only that layoffs and 
claims for joblessness benefits are up in the United States, but also 
that the rate of American job-exportation has more than doubled 
since the last electoral cycle.  This year’s American political 
candidates have been quick to take note.  In consequence, more 
than at any time since the early 1990s, continued American, and 
with it other developed economies’, participation in the World 
Trade Organization and processes of global economic integration 
more generally appear to be up for grabs. 
It is not clear, on reflection, how to regard these developments 
from a normative point of view.  On the one hand, there seems no 
gainsaying the claim that the gradual removal of transnational 
trade and investment barriers has resulted in a more rapid 
economic growth worldwide.  That growth appears to be lifting 
many once desperately poor persons out of their erstwhile penury.  
On the other hand, there is also no denying that global trade and 
investment liberalization are wreaking losses at least as 
conspicuous as the gains.  Many, if not most, of the victims of 
globalization are those who until recently occupied positions much 
like those that are coming to be occupied by globalization’s more 
sympathetic beneficiaries, and who climbed out of them via 
precisely such legislated standards as offshoring firms now evade.  
Might we pay “Peter” without robbing “Paul”? 
This Article proposes an ethically and intuitively attractive 
answer to that question rooted in financial engineering.  The key is 
to channel a portion of the globalization-wrought gains reaped by 
outsourcing firms to the outsourced employees themselves.  This 
way the latter are directly benefited by the very processes that 
currently harm them.  The method proposed is to adapt the 
familiar Employee Stock Ownership Plan, or “ESOP,” to spread 
firm-shares not simply to current labor, but to outsourced and 
otherwise harmed “shadow” labor as well.  The Article also 
proposes means of diversifying the portfolio risk that will face 
“OutsourceSOP” participants, and maps the supporting role apt to 
be played by such globalization-constitutive financial institutions 
as the IMF and the World Bank.  In the long run, the Article urges, 
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we have here the makings of a grander ambition that all the 
world’s inhabitants can jointly support—a “Global Shareholder 
Society.” 
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1.  INTRODUCTION:  THE QUANDARY OF ROBBED “PETER,” PAID 
“PAUL,” & OVERPAID “MARY” 
With the American economy seemingly stalling, the global 
economy consequently imperiled, and another electoral campaign 
season well underway in the United States, the “outsourcing” of 
jobs from the developed to the developing world is again on the 
public agenda.  The latest figures indicate not only that layoffs and 
claims for joblessness benefits are up in the United States, but also 
that the rate of American job-exportation has more than doubled 
since the last electoral cycle.1  Corroborative data concerning 
resultant wage- and benefit-stagnation, as well as declining 
workplace health and safety standards, now abounds.2  This year’s 
American political candidates have been quick to take note: the 
“middle class squeeze,” and the role of global trade and 
investment liberalization therein, figure prominently in stump 
speeches by candidates from both major U.S. political parties.  
These issues are also the stuff of now nightly jeremiads by popular 
news pundits on American cable news programs.3  More than at 
 
1 See Morning Edition: Offshoring Doubles, But Political Focus on Retraining 
Workers, (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 3, 2008) (discussing the phenomenon of 
increased offshoring of jobs coupled with political reactions to the increase), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 87851332. 
2 Id. 
3 See, e.g., LOU DOBBS, WAR ON THE MIDDLE CLASS: HOW THE GOVERNMENT, BIG 
BUSINESS, AND SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS ARE WAGING WAR ON THE AMERICAN 
DREAM AND HOW TO FIGHT BACK (2006) (examining the negative impact of special 
interest groups and other political organizations on the American middle class); 
LOU DOBBS, EXPORTING AMERICA: WHY CORPORATE GREED IS SHIPPING AMERICAN 
JOBS OVERSEAS (2004) (decrying the impact of free trade on the American middle 
class).  May God forgive me for citing these but they do appear to be 
representative of a distinct and increasingly pronounced strain of the present day 
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any time since the early 1990s, it seems, continued American 
participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and in the processes of 
global economic integration more generally appear to be up for 
grabs.  The United States is but one developed country in which 
public discourse is taking this turn. 
It is not really clear, on reflection, how to regard these 
developments from a normative point of view.  Slogans aside, 
global trade and investment liberalization present a genuine 
quandary to those who are serious about justice and human well-
being.  On the one hand, there is no gainsaying the claim that the 
gradual removal of transnational trade and investment barriers has 
been resulting in more rapid economic growth worldwide,4 and 
that growth appears to be lifting many once desperately poor 
persons out of their erstwhile penury.5  All of this seems to be 
happening, moreover, much in the way—pursuant, indeed, to the 
very dynamic—that students of political economy since the 
“classical” era of Smith, Ricardo, and Mill long have predicted: 
freely moving investment capital and purchase orders increasingly 
flow to those locales where they yield the highest returns on 
investment and expenditure.  This flow of capital and purchase 
orders is raising the incomes of the once global poor, and is also 
lowering the prices of many goods and services for which 
everyone once paid much more.6 
On the other hand, however, there is no denying that global 
trade and investment liberalization are wreaking losses at least as 
conspicuous as the gains: losses such as employment, declining 
incomes and workplace standards, and associated dislocations in 
the erstwhile “developed” economies.7  Crucially, these losses do 
not accrue solely, mainly, or even noticeably, to complacent 
plutocratic rascals of the sort long since fingered by Smith and his 
“public choice” school descendants as being ever the principal 
 
discourse on globalization. 
4 See generally Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra headnote (suggesting 
solutions to systemic inequities in the new global economy). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 One even encounters discussion, not only of deindustrialization, but of 
backward movement along such venerable metrics of basic human development 
as health, education, and even literacy in the United States, for example.  See, e.g., 
id.  Hence, one presumes, the popularity of such phrases as “trading places,” used 
of the developed and developing economies. 
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advocates of “protectionist” policies of all stripes.8  Rather, many, if 
not most, of the “victims” of globalization today seem to be those 
who until recently occupied positions much like those now coming 
to be occupied by globalization’s more sympathetic beneficiaries—
and who indeed climbed out of their disadvantaged positions 
through precisely such legislated labor, health, and safety 
standards as offshoring firms now evade.9 
It is precisely this that underwrites the quandary mentioned 
above.  For what are we to think of—how are we ethically to assess 
and regard—a process that “robs,” so to speak, faultless “Peter” to 
pay faultless “Paul”?  Symmetrically, what do we make of a status 
quo ante that kept faultless “Paul” in his poverty while benefiting 
faultless “Peter”?  And finally, how, if at all, should our assessment 
be altered if “Peter” is robbed not only to pay “Paul,” but less 
sympathetic, rich “Mary” as well? 
Now one might suggest various means by which to address the 
dilemma—what we might call “the assessment dilemma.”  One 
family of such means in particular has been favored, historically, 
by many mainstream economists and policy advocates since at 
least Bentham’s day: this theory suggests that we seek means of 
commensurating the gains and the losses accruing to “Peters,” 
“Pauls,” and “Marys,” then choose such policies as yield the 
greatest net gains or least losses.  Relatedly, and now heuristically 
more conveniently, one might propose fixing on some readymade 
index—such as global GDP—then select policies best calculated to 
“maximize” it.  One then labels policies that maximize aggregates 
of this sort “efficient,” yielding “more bang”—more aggregate 
benefit—for “the buck”—the same or lower cost.  It is actually 
quite remarkable, on reflection, how many contributors to public 
discussion of globalization—and indeed of public policy more 
generally—adopt points of view of this general type.10 
 
8 See generally Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote (discussing how the IMF, 
the World Bank, and the GATT/WTO can, and should, promote equal treatment 
and market completion). 
9 Id. 
10 See, e.g., Hockett, Limits, supra headnote (reviewing and critiquing a treatise 
on international law that details the prominence of state actors in a global society).  
For more of the aforementioned “reflection,” see Hockett, Three Pillars, supra 
headnote; Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote; Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, 
supra headnote.  See also Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A Meta-
Theory of Justice, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, The Deep 
Grammar of Distribution] (examining common schemes within numerous 
distribution theories); Robert Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously (Cornell Legal 
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It is exceedingly doubtful, however, that proffered approaches 
to the assessment dilemma of this species are apt to prove 
satisfactory for long, either prudentially or ethically speaking.  For 
as a prudential matter, perceivedly “robbed,” faultless “Peters” 
cannot plausibly be expected to acquiesce in their “robbery” 
indefinitely, simply because some of the spoils assist “Pauls.”  At 
least this seems so given the “Peters’” own recent history of 
struggle to win wealth shares from less sympathetic and no more 
deserving rich “Marys,” who presently appear to be benefiting 
along with—and, crucially, even more than—the “Pauls” at the 
“Peters’” expense.11  Political developments underway in the 
United States and other developed economies, mentioned in the 
opening paragraphs above, appear to bear out this prudential 
prognostication.12 
But even more importantly than prudential considerations 
here, as an ethical matter it would seem neither the “Peters” who 
have been robbed through no fault of their own, nor anyone else 
rightfully can accept, without alteration or emendation, a 
systematic transfer—a regressive redistribution—from 
hypothetically faultless “Peters” to undeserving “Marys.”  At least 
that is so if the “Peters” are truly faultless and the “Marys” are 
truly “undeserving,” and if some workable, ameliorative alteration 
lies to hand.13  If the antecedent conditions obtain—that is, if the 
 
Stud. Res., Paper No. 08-004, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108217 [hereinafter Hockett, Taking Distribution 
Seriously]; Robert Hockett, The Impossibility of a Prescriptive Paretian (Cornell Legal 
Stud. Res., Paper No. 06-027, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cmf?abstract_id=930460; Robert Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe: 
Preferences, Principles and Imperatives in Law and Policy (Cornell Legal Stud. Res., 
Paper No. 08-028, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=1266270. 
11 See Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote (describing how the Bretton 
Woods institutions, particularly the World Bank, have fallen short of their 
potential to bring about a just world economic order); Hockett, Global Macro-
Hedging, supra headnote, at 114 (setting forth proposals for “more just and 
efficient systemic income-risk-sharing” among employers and employees). 
12 So would the growing chorus of anti-WTO protests worldwide, and also 
the protectionist backlash of the 1930s—forebear to the postwar Bretton Woods 
institutions themselves.  See Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote (restating 
many criticisms of the Bretton Woods institutions and the failure of the global 
market to promote global economic justice). 
13 Id. (discussing the question of agency on the part of beneficiaries and 
victims of global markets, and proposing a role for international financial 
institutions to undertake in pursuit of distributive justice). 
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“Peters” are faultless and the “Marys” are less than deserving and 
are merely the beneficiaries of windfalls—then transfers from the 
former to the latter are, simply, unjust.  By definition, it is wrongful 
to tolerate, let alone foment, remediable injustice. 
This Article accordingly aims to propose and discuss one 
possible method of remediation that seems open to us—all of us 
sharing the globe.  It proposes that we add a bit of financial 
“irrigation” to the processes of global trade and investment 
liberalization.  The object is a set of financial arrangements that re-
channel some of the gains that those mentioned processes 
presently channel away from the “Peters” to already advantaged 
“Marys,” back to those recently and now seemingly again 
disadvantaged “Peters.”  Insofar as they do so, they not only 
remediate injustice, thus realizing the end that this Article sets for 
them, but also realize this end by means that are apt, in contrast to 
garden variety taxation and redistribution policies, to resonate in 
an intuitively satisfactory way with the ethical commitments and 
endowment dispositions that all of us—”Peters,” “Pauls,” and 
“Marys” alike—seem to share.14  Hence they seem optimally to 
accommodate both ethical and prudential desiderata. 
We can think of this Article’s proposed arrangements as 
financial “bypass surgery,” so to speak—a bit of added arterial 
flow to afford globalization a healthier heart.  If the metaphor is 
apt, it will mean that continued trade and investment liberalization 
can be made to benefit “Pauls” in a manner that does not rob 
“Peters” or “Marys.”  That will be globalization that gives rise to 
less ambiguous justice- and wealth-gains, hence globalization 
which all of us who share the globe can get behind and endorse.  
Indeed, it will be more.  For the particular arrangements proposed 
here are such as to make all of us part owners in all of the world’s 
largest—its globe-straddling—firms.  They are such as to make of 
us a global shareholder society. 
“Smoke and mirrors?,” some might now be asking.  Well, no: 
finance.  Or more to the point: financial engineering.  The key to 
solving both our ethical assessment dilemma and our current 
 
14 “Endowment dispositions” refers to certain behavioral-psychological 
tendencies that behavioral economists and legal scholars have in recent years 
documented extensively.  I will elaborate, as well as endeavor to substantiate the 
claims I have just made.  See infra Sections 3 and 4 (elaborating on “endowment 
dispositions” and the means by which distribution goals ought to be 
accomplished).  See also Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote (exploring the 
theoretical structure of ownership in an equal-opportunity society). 
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political stalemate over globalization is to channel some shares in 
“Mary’s” trade- and investment-benefited firms to the laboring 
“Peters” whom crossborder trade and investment increasingly 
tend to displace.  If globalization disemploys faultless “Peter,” that 
is to say, and if only lesser paying jobs subsequently remain to be 
had even after aging “Peter” “retools,” then we can make “Peter” 
part-owner of the firm that has displaced or discarded him.  That 
way everyone not only wins, but wins in a way that is just as 
immediately intuitively—i.e., endowment-psychologically15—as it 
is ethically attractive.  Indeed it is a way that takes concrete and 
straightforward steps toward realizing a hope that seems implicitly 
to have underwritten countless denunciations of “globalization” 
since the dawn of the modern era over two centuries ago.16  Such is 
the prospect this Article explores. 
The Article proceeds, then, as follows:  Section 2 first fleshes 
out in more detail who is meant here by “Peters,” “Pauls,” and 
“Marys,” as well as what is meant by “robbed,” “faultless,” 
“deserving,” and “undeserving” in characterizing these 
personages.  This serves to sharpen the quandary to which this 
Introduction has been referring—the assessment dilemma.  It also 
serves to highlight some premises that appear to underwrite that 
quandary—premises that empirical work can serve either partly or 
fully to corroborate or falsify.17 
Section 3 then elaborates the structure of a familiar share-
spreading prototype from which this Article’s proposal less 
familiarly, but straightforwardly, extends—the employee stock 
ownership plan, or ESOP.  The ESOP, as it happens, is woefully 
inadequate to the task for which it was originally embraced by the 
United Kingdom Parliament and the United States Congress—the 
provision of income security to U.K. and U.S. laborers.  However, 
the financial structure of the ESOP, and that structure’s resonance 
 
15 “Endowment psychology” here refers to such familiar “behaviouralist” 
heuristics as loss-aversion—interpretive dispositions with which the proposals 
herein make accommodation.  See infra Section 3. 
16 See, e.g., AMIYA KUMAR BAGCHI, PERILOUS PASSAGE: MANKIND AND THE 
GLOBAL ASCENDANCY OF CAPITAL (2005) (challenging a Eurocentric view of 
economic history that minimizes the interests and activities of non-European 
players and portrays globalization as necessarily a zero-sum game). 
17 The proposal can accordingly be taken for conditional in nature: if the 
premises drawn out in Section 2 are correct—which may be plausible but there is 
no space here to do more than partly corroborate this assertion—then the proposal 
would seem attractive. 
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with a number of deep-seated justice intuitions and behavioral-
psychological dispositions of the sort mentioned above,18 hold at 
least one strong attraction―they render the ESOP a politically ideal 
template from which to extend when we seek means of channeling 
a share of the capital gains currently realized by firm owners who 
benefit by trade and investment liberalization, to laborers now 
faultlessly being displaced by the same. 
Sections 4 and 5 carry out the project of analogical extension 
just described in two steps.  Section 4 shows how readily the ESOP 
form can be varied simply by varying the patronage relations 
which both essentially define and ethically underwrite it.19  Section 
5 then shows how readily laborers’ displacement by globalization-
facilitated outsourcing can stand in as an ethically and 
endowment-intuitively compelling “shadow” form of patronage.  
If this is right, then we have here an elegant means both of 
addressing the assessment dilemma with which our discussion 
here has opened, and of winning more stakeholders in, and 
supporters of, globalization than it seems apt to keep should 
today’s trends continue. 
Section 6 then briefly treats of the central coordinating role that 
the international financial institutions (IFIs) both can and should 
take in facilitating, and perhaps even administering, such 
programs as those proposed in Section 5.20  For, Section 6 
maintains, programs of this sort are not only programs in respect 
of which the IFIs bear comparative advantage.  They also, and not 
 
18 Supra note 11, and accompanying text. 
19 By “patronage” I mean simply a sustained mode of relation between 
persons and firms.  See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 
(1996) (enumerating different patterns of ownership of firms favored within 
different industries and nations); infra Section 4.  In the case of ESOPs, labor is the 
salient form of patronage.  But see infra Section 4 (arguing that there are other 
forms of patronage, including faultlessly lost employment on the part of those 
lacking in “retooling” opportunity). 
20 The principal IFIs we will consider are the International Monetary Fund 
(“Fund,” IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(“World Bank,” “Bank,” IBRD).  But much that Section 6 sets forth carries over to 
the missions of other IFIs, including the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
the African Development Bank (ADB), the Asian Development Bank (ABD), the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).  Like remarks apply to the Group of 
Eight (G8), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), and other constituent institutions of the so-called “New International 
Financial Architecture” (NIFA).  On the latter, as well as the mentioned 
institutions, see Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote; infra Section 6. 
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accidentally, are precisely the sort of fare for which the IFIs—the 
Bretton Woods IFIs in particular—are designed in their 
globalization-complementary roles.21  Indeed, Section 6 argues, 
facilitating such programs as these would confer on the IMF and 
the World Bank roles relative to their earlier missions analogous to 
that of the WTO relative to its stillborn forebear, the International 
Trade Organization (ITO) envisaged in the post Second World War 
founding era.22 
The Conclusion then briefly addresses anticipated objections 
and looks forward. 
2. THE QUANDARY SHARPENED AND DIAGNOSED, AND A SOLUTION 
PROPOSED 
In order to render the considerations that prompt the proposals 
below more fully appreciable, it will be helpful first briefly to 
identify, in more detail, the precise sources of the assessment 
dilemma described in the Introduction.  For there appear to be 
several widely held assumptions that lurk in the background of 
much debate over globalization.  These seem in turn not only to 
underwrite the quandary itself, but to point toward the best means 
of addressing the same. 
The first assumption is that there is, “out there in the world,” a 
global endowment of “primal stuff,” or of what we might 
somewhat more preciously call “ethically exogenous resources.”23  
These are things nobody has produced and thus no one can claim  
 
 
 
21 See Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra headnote (exploring the intended 
role of the Bretton Woods IFIs). 
22 Infra Section 6 (arguing that the International Trade Organization’s 
envisioned role may be carried out by a reinvented IMF and World Bank).  See also 
Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote (defending the IMF’s departure from its 
stated mandate in dealing with Asian financial crises in the late 1990s). 
23 This is what I call them in the sources cited supra headnote.  Some call 
them “luck,” some “advantage,” some “resources.”  See, e.g., Hockett, Three Pillars, 
supra headnote, at 111.  Another name for them that has been proposed elsewhere 
is “material opportunity.”  All of these variants work, but they bear the weakness 
of suggesting that the user of the term is unaware that some resources, 
advantages, etc. are themselves the product of responsible action on the part of 
the beneficiary, in which case they are ethically endogenous and not the sort of 
thing that concerns us here.  See PETER DRUCKER, THE PENSION FUND REVOLUTION 
(1996). 
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credit for or ultimate ethical title to.  They jointly add up to a sort 
of “primal given,” a substrate of basic resources from which other 
things valued by human beings are made.24 
Informally and intuitively, we might at first pass think of this 
global “stuff” as including inert and insipid material substances 
like petroleum, natural gas, coal, copper, gold, magnesium—all 
manner of useful hence valued materials to which no one initially 
has any more legal or ethical claim than has anyone else.  At next 
pass, moving outward from heuristically easy examples like those, 
we can enrich the description of “global stuff” by including what 
might be called “cultural deposits.”  Here we refer to accumulated 
knowledge, practical know-how, even the languages in which we 
generally think and through which we communicate.25 
All things that have been left us by our forebears, which none 
of us has produced and yet many of us derive value from—hence 
to which none of us bears any more prior ethical claim than she can 
assert in respect of newly discovered mineral wealth—would 
count as cultural deposits of this kind.  These deposits too, one 
suspects, tend implicitly to be viewed as what we are calling 
ethically exogenous.  Their possession or otherwise is a matter of 
brute luck.  From a normative point of view, they no more 
properly belong to one person than to another prior to anyone’s 
responsible, value-adding behavior.  Access to such forms of 
wealth owes more to good fortune in the “birth lottery” than to 
any form of creditably virtuous, value-additive activity. 
Now if it is plausible to partition things in this way—to 
maintain that there is some such stock of ethically exogenous yet 
widely valued “stuff” to which no one bears ethical claims prior to 
anyone else’s—then it seems fair to suppose something else: it 
seems sensible to maintain that every human person—all of us 
who share the globe, everyone who is an appropriate subject of our 
ethical concern—is entitled in justice to an equal pro rata share of 
this stock.  That seems a straightforward consequence of our belief 
that all people are, ethically speaking, created equal—that is to say, 
 
24 Hillel Steiner has an evocative name for it, calling it the “global fund.”  See 
HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS 270 (1994). 
25 A remarkably illuminating discussion of the global advantages conferred 
by birth into a language community is found in DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK 
POWER AND GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 
(forthcoming from Yale University Press, 2008). 
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that all are equally entitled to our ethical concern.  For such 
concern surely must include concern that persons bear access to the 
physical stuff of which successful, well-faring lives are built up.26  
Call it “real,” “material,” or “substantive” concern, as 
distinguished from merely “abstract” or “formal” concern. 
In the case of that portion of “stuff” for the existence of which 
no one now living is responsible, equal material concern of the 
kind just mentioned must surely amount to concern for material 
equality: that is to say, equality of access to ethically exogenous 
resources and opportunity.27  And this, one suspects, is the second 
working assumption that many people attempting to think 
through the ethical significance of global trade and investment 
liberalization operate under.  We tend to think intuitively of all 
human beings as bearing, by way of birthright, a right to equal 
opportunity—not just formal opportunity, but “substantive,” 
material opportunity as well.  Hence we view all human beings as 
bearing equal claims to whatever resources are out there that 
nobody now living is actually creditable with having responsibly 
brought into existence.28  This is just part of what it is, ethically 
speaking, for all of us who share the globe to regard one another as 
equally human, equally deserving of ethical regard, equal in 
justice.  The first two assumptions are ethical-theoretic in nature.  
They are grounded in widely-shared principle, which do not 
appeal to “facts on the ground.”29  The remaining assumptions, by 
contrast, involve empirical elements as well as theoretical ones. 
The third assumption is that the endowment of global “stuff,” 
referred to per the first assumption, is not actually distributed 
equally in the pro rata manner described per the second 
assumption.  It is not the case that every person actually holds her 
rightful pro rata share of the world’s ethically exogenous 
resources.  Some people are born into wealthy countries possessed 
of abundant natural or even cultural resources, where the 
continuing in rem jurisdiction or title is largely enshrined in 
 
26 The claim here is not that such stuff is the sole “input” to well-faring, or 
“welfare,” but simply that these items are among such inputs—that physical items 
are one of the foundational aspects of human well-being or welfare. 
27 For more on this, see Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 10. 
28 “The Creator has bestowed this manna upon all of us,” one might say in a 
more venerable idiom. 
29 See Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 10 and Hockett, 
Three Pillars, supra headnote, for more on the near-universality of these ethical 
postulates. 
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international law.30  Others are born into wealthy families whose 
familial wealth is protected—and nowadays decreasingly taxed—
under domestic property, tort, and even constitutional legal 
arrangements.31  Still other people are faultlessly born without such 
advantages, perhaps even born with severe handicaps, for which 
neither domestic nor international law require or afford 
compensation.32 
Insofar as all of this is the case, there are people in the world 
with more than, as well as people in the world with less than, their 
apparently rightful pro rata shares of the ethically exogenous 
global endowment per the first two assumptions.  Hence, there is a 
gap between our ethical “ought” intuitions and our present day 
“is” circumstances.  So runs the third implicit assumption. 
Further specification of this third assumption yields the fourth 
assumption.  One can partition all persons entitled to our equal 
ethical concern into four subclasses.33  Call the first class the 
“Ones.”  The “Ones” are those who, per the second and third 
assumptions, hold more than their ethically required pro rata 
shares.  They hold more than what they actually bear rights to 
hold, per the second assumption, of the ethically exogenous 
“stuff.”  Perhaps they are born to rich families, born in rich 
countries, or both.  They simply are lucky, favored by accident or 
fortune relative to others, and often protected in their exclusive 
enjoyment of such favor by law. 
Lest the point here be misunderstood, it is important to 
emphasize what is not being suggested.  To be sure, much—even 
very much—of any given “One’s” surplus over the equal resource 
baseline might owe to his own laudably responsible, value-
additive efforts.  Hence much, even most, of a particular “One’s” 
surplus might be ethically regarded as properly, in justice, 
 
30 See generally Hockett, Limits, supra headnote (reviewing a treatise on 
international law that discussed state actors and their strategies, and relative 
differences in the distribution of assets among individuals). 
31 Id. 
32 It could be argued that the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
and, more strongly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights enshrine such norms.  But thus far neither the Declaration nor the 
Covenant appear to have been widely read—or at any rate vindicated by state 
action—in so fulsome a manner.  See id.  It is to be hoped—and advocated—that 
matters on this score will change. 
33 For some purposes, three would suffice; for others, five or more might be 
preferable.  This will be developed later in the Article. 
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belonging to him.  The point here is simply that not all of it does in 
the case of the “Ones” as a whole.  Yet, some of these “Ones” have 
ethically exogenous holdings exceeding their pro rata entitlement. 
The remaining classes of persons pursuant to the third 
assumption can quickly be characterized relative to the first.  The 
second class, call them “Twos,” hold roughly their rightful pro rata 
shares—not substantially more and not substantially less.  Then 
there is another class, “Threes,” who hold substantially, but 
perhaps not dramatically, less than their rightful pro rata shares.  
And finally there are those—the “Fours”—who hold much less than 
their rightful shares of the global endowment.  If born into and 
confined to particularly arid environments, or violent and 
impoverished ghettos, or enclosed refugee camps, some “Fours” 
(the reader could even call them “Fives”) might indeed be down 
near to “zero,” so to speak.  Such “Fours” are deprived of sufficient 
basic resources required to sustain recognizably human lives.34  
And if born with severe handicaps they might even be thought—
depending upon whether we account genetically transmitted 
“human resources” among the world’s ethically exogenous 
resources—to be “negatively” endowed, marked for death or 
profound suffering absent medical intervention.35 
Thus runs the fourth assumption.  It is simply that none of the 
just-defined classes—neither the “Ones,” “Twos,” “Threes,” nor 
“Fours”—are null.36  To sum up, there are some who hold more 
than they have earned, others who hold more or less what they 
have earned, and still others who hold less than—in some cases 
dramatically less than—that which in fairness they rightfully 
deserve. 
Finally, there appear to be three further, more quickly 
characterizable, assumptions under which many who experience 
our mentioned quandary tend to operate when thinking about 
global trade and investment liberalization.  The fifth assumption is 
that the class of “Ones” is roughly coextensive with the class of 
significant residual claimants upon, and creditors of, business 
 
34 A presently salient group of actual “Fours” (or even “Fives”) might be 
those confined to the refugee camps of Darfur, for example. 
35 Insofar as handicaps are genetic and undeserved, it seems sensible to think 
of them as resource-deficits in this sense.  See Hockett, Taking Distribution 
Seriously, supra note 10 (analyzing the legal and policy aspects of distribution of 
social welfare). 
36 The “Twos” could drop out of the account without loss to the principal 
thrust of the argument, for reasons that will shortly become clear. 
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firms.  The “Ones” largely coincide with the class of large-scale 
shareholders and holders of high-valued quantities of debt 
securities issued by firms.  They are, by and large, substantial 
owners of and lenders to firms.37  A safe corollary assumption 
would be that significant portions of these people’s portfolios are 
inherited or otherwise plausibly regarded as windfalls; but we will 
see that no such corollary is necessary to what this Article will be 
arguing.38 
The sixth, and related, assumption is that the classes of “Twos” 
and “Threes,” together, are roughly coextensive with the class of 
minimal-shareholding or non-shareholding.  They are generally 
either white collar salary-earning, or union-scale blue collar wage-
earning, workers for firms headquartered or substantially 
operating in countries with advanced economies.  These people, 
particularly the high-waged and salary-earning, have for the most 
part been born into, and raised in, the generally nurturing 
environments of well-to-do households and neighborhoods.  They 
have also enjoyed access to good educations, healthy 
environments, and well functioning societies, this assumption 
would run.39  They accordingly possess much in the way of well 
developed “human capital,” “cultural capital,” and “social capital.”   
 
 
 
 
37 For extensive empirical corroboration of this point, and graphic illustration 
of how comparatively few (in the neighborhood of five percent of) people hold so 
comparatively large percentage (over ninety) of corporate securities in the United 
States for example, see Hockett, Of ESOPs, supra headnote, at 897–912.  Such 
figures, released annually by the U.S. Federal Reserve, among other compilers, 
might temper some of the more extravagant claims one sometimes hears in the 
States, to the effect that the United States is already possessed of an “equity 
culture.”  This Article, along with its predecessors cited above in the headnote, 
can accordingly be viewed in part as prompted by a hope to bring the United 
States, and the world economy more generally, into closer approximation to that 
ideal which some seem to think is already realized. 
38 There is substantial statistical evidence to the effect that the 
overwhelmingly greater part of corporate securities—both equity and debt 
instruments—held by Americans is inherited.  See infra, Section 4; Hockett, Of 
ESOPs?, supra headnote, at 873–90 (discussing the concentrated nature of 
securities ownership in the United States). 
39 Again, the point here is not that there are not many people who have 
lacked in some of these advantages and nevertheless made successes of their lives.  
The point is simply that there are many who have built such successes on the 
basis of good background conditions but little if any inherited business capital. 
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But they possess dramatically less than the “Ones” when it comes 
to inherited financial capital—creditor and ownership interests in 
firms.40 
The seventh, final, and again related assumption is that the 
class of “Fours” (even “Fives,” if such there be) is roughly 
coextensive with the class of very low-wage earners, often or 
persistently unemployed, as well as subsistence agriculturists 
worldwide.  The vast majority of these people, moreover, inhabit 
economically underdeveloped countries without much access to 
valuable material resources, inherited wealth, or even effective 
political, economic, and social infrastructures or educational and 
other institutions.  “Social capital” and “cultural capital” are as 
scarce or as poorly distributed as is “natural capital” in the 
precincts inhabited by “Fours.”  And so, in consequence, is 
“human capital” too.41 
The seven assumptions just elaborated give rise to this Article’s 
opening quandary of Peter, Paul, and Mary.  If the assumptions are 
at least partly correct, then global trade and investment 
liberalization will bear the following curious attributes.  First, they 
will tend to most immediately benefit the “Ones” and the 
“Fours”—in particular, the “Fours” in those economically lesser 
developed jurisdictions where, by hypothesis, most of the “Fours” 
live.  For the firms owned and lent to by “Ones” are the first 
beneficiaries of trade and investment liberalization.42  And the 
benefits, realized largely because of the hiring of desperate “Fours” 
willing to work in unregulated environments for low wages, go  
 
 
40 The assumption here would not rule out non-negligible stock-holding and 
bond-holding—direct, indirect, or beneficial—by “Twos” and “Threes.”  The 
assumption simply argues that these groups’ ownership and creditor stakes are 
very much less than are those of the “Ones.”  For empirical corroboration of this 
suspicion, as well as specification of what “direct,” “indirect,” and “beneficial” 
firm-owning are, please see infra, Section 4; Hockett, Of ESOPs?, supra headnote, 
at 873–85. 
41 See Hockett, Of ESOPs?, supra headnote, at 873–85 (comparing the value of 
stocks held by “Ones” to the relatively low value of stocks held by “Twos” and 
“Threes”); see also Hockett, Jeffersonian Republics, supra headnote (promoting the 
ideals of an “ownership society”). 
42 See Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote (detailing how the IMF and the 
Bank worked towards equitable distribution in the aftermath of the Argentine and 
Asian financial crises); see also Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra headnote 
(arguing that despite global market liberalization there is a disparity in profit 
distribution). 
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immediately to “Ones.”  If that is correct, then the “Ones” are those 
called the “Marys” in the Introduction, and the “Fours” are the 
paid “Pauls.” 
Second, if the assumptions are correct, trade and investment 
liberalization will tend to benefit the “Ones” and the “Fours” at the 
immediate expense of the “Twos” and the “Threes”—particularly 
those in economically well developed jurisdictions where, by 
hypothesis, most of the “Twos” and “Threes” live.  For as firms 
realize growing profits by avoiding the labor, environmental, and 
other regulatory standards that once constrained them in the 
developed jurisdictions,43 the formerly salaried and higher-waged 
officers and other employees of these firms—”Twos” and 
“Threes”—begin to lose increments of salary, wage, and other 
benefits.  And these latter were won, not many decades ago, 
through precisely such domestic labor and employee benefit 
legislation as globalization now enables the firms—and the “Ones” 
who own and finance them—to evade.44  So the “Twos” and the 
“Threes” will be those labeled “Peters” in the Introduction.  They 
now largely finance the gains realized by the “Pauls” and the 
“Marys.”45 
But if all of this is so, then it means that global trade and 
investment liberalization as presently conceived and executed are 
inherently ethically ambiguous, perhaps even altogether 
indeterminate.  And it is precisely this ambiguity, it is hard not to 
suspect, that ultimately accounts for the difficulty described in the 
Introduction—the quandary that many of us worldwide tend to 
experience in attempting to determine whether globalization is a 
good thing, and thus what kinds of conditions, if any, should be 
superimposed upon any would-be continued, sustainable course of 
trade and investment liberalization. 
Here, more precisely, is the fundamental problem:  Insofar as it 
is possible to restrict comparison to “Ones” on the one hand and 
 
43 It would happen, of course, in any of several familiar ways: firms in the 
developed world would outsource or threaten to outsource to less regulated 
jurisdictions.  Firms in the developing and less regulated world, for their parts, 
would export to the once-regulated developed world, and would do so cheaply 
by dint of the costs saved via non-regulation.  And the latter course strengthens 
the force of the former course.  See id. 
44 I am ignoring longer-term “rising tides lift all boats” type claims for the 
moment. 
45 See generally sources cited in supra headnote. 
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“Twos” and/or “Threes” on the other, simply leaving “Fours” out 
of account in a sort of ethical blind spot, there appears to be a 
straightforward ethical loss in the case of global trade and 
investment liberalization.  At least that is so in the short term, and 
probably it is so for the long term as well, in view of individuals’ 
“retooling” costs and the relatively brief length of a working life.46  
If one fails to consider the “Fours”—that is, ignore the desperately 
poor, most of whom operate outside of the advanced economies—
it seems pretty clear that globalization is altogether a bad thing, for 
we are benefiting the “Ones” at the expense of the “Twos” and the 
“Threes.”  And, by hypothesis—per the assumptions elaborated 
above—the “Ones” are already over-endowed, the “Twos” are at 
best adequately endowed, and the “Threes” are under-endowed.  
So redistributing from the “Twos” and the “Threes” to the “Ones” 
yields a straightforward justice-loss. 
It is tempting to suspect that many opponents of trade and 
investment liberalization, at least those who oppose it without any 
misgivings, think along these lines.  Yet they may not consider the 
“Fours,” who are often in an ethical blind spot, rendering it easy to 
suppose globalization to be unambiguously wrongful.47 
Now, if by contrast, one restricts comparison to the “Twos” 
and/or “Threes” on the one hand and the “Fours” on the other, 
leaving the “Ones” out of account in the ethical blind spot, then one 
faces the prospect of an unambiguous sort of justice gain wrought 
by global trade and investment liberalization.  For the “degree” of 
global injustice—the justice-shortfall, as one might call it—can be 
viewed in this case as now being partly made up.  Ethically 
exogenous global “stuff” is more nearly equalized between 
“Twos,” “Threes,” and “Fours;” whereas before, the “Twos” were 
by dint of mere luck better off than the “Threes,” who by dint of 
mere luck were better off than the “Fours.”  Looking again at the 
“Ones,” this new distribution—which, again, is the hypothetically 
ethical equalization of ethically exogenous global “stuff”—will 
 
46 See, e.g., Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra headnote (discussing the 
effects of global market liberalization on the global economic order). 
47 It might also be argued, of course, that they ignore the lowering of prices, 
which benefits “everybody.”  This argument is weak precisely because “everyone” 
benefits in this sense.  The benefit here is quite thinly spread, whereas the harms 
that these people are concerned about are quite thickly concentrated—on 
precisely the wrong people.  He who loses his income and cannot retool is not 
consoled by the fact that his poisonous toothpaste or his child’s toxic toy now will 
cost pennies less. 
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appear as a straightforward justice-gain. 
Just as it is the “Fours” who appear to be forgotten by those 
who view globalization as unambiguously wrongful, so it seems to 
be “Ones” who are forgotten by those who view globalization as 
straightforwardly salutary—all those who say, simply, “think 
about all those desperate global poor who have jobs now.”  These 
people are of course partly right: one should be thinking about the 
desperate global poor—the “Fours.”  But the “Ones” are left out of 
the account in this case.  Yet they can no more rightfully be left out 
of account in this case than can “Fours,” if what ought to be all of 
the justice-accounting is to be complete.  And this is, of course, the 
root of the assessment dilemma described in the Introduction. 
If this is correct, then all who share the globe are faced with 
both a challenge of vision and, yet more urgently, a challenge of 
action.  For if the just-proffered diagnosis is correct, then the only 
way to adequately and usefully address the quandary would seem 
to require a two-fold epistemic and programmatic approach.  First, 
epistemically speaking, one must keep all relevant parties—the 
“Ones,” “Twos,” “Threes,” and “Fours”—simultaneously in view 
when assessing, structuring, or rerouting the course of global trade 
and investment liberalization.  Second, programmatically 
speaking, one must seek means of ensuring that “Ones” but not 
“Fours” share the gains wrought by the windfalls of trade and 
investment liberalization with “Twos” and, especially, “Threes.” 
Note that the second task is in a sense more urgent than the 
first.  That is because, unless one can find means by which the 
“Ones” share their gains with the “Twos” and the “Threes,” there 
seems no way of acting at all upon the first task.  Successful 
resolution of the epistemic problem here, it seems, depends upon 
resolution of the practical problem.  Until we discharge the second 
task, that is, it appears we shall never escape the assessment 
dilemma.  For the latter amounts to a case of ethical indeterminacy 
wrought by incomplete specification of the assessment domain, 
while the assessment domain seems completable only by practical 
measures that actually link “Ones,” “Twos,” “Threes,” and 
“Fours.”  Absent a practical linkage of all, either the “Ones” or the 
“Fours” are missing from one horn of our ethical dilemma.  And 
there seems no way to determinately adjudge, under the aspect of  
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justice, when a justice gain wrought by transfers from “Twos” or 
“Threes” to “Fours” is swamped by a justice-loss wrought by 
simultaneous transfers from “Twos” or “Threes” to “Ones.”48 
Unless, then, we design practical means of connecting global 
“Ones,” “Twos,” “Threes,” and Fours, in our ethical assessments 
we are effectively attempting to deal with a trivalent ethical 
problem by means of a two-variable formula.49  Only by adding a 
variable does one render the problem soluble.  And only in that 
way, accordingly, is it possible to ensure that globalization might 
constitute a straightforward ethical gain.  The pressing normative-
theoretical problem that is the assessment dilemma, that is, 
appears to be soluble only by practical means.  One must embark 
on a project of institutional design.50 
It is tempting to think, per this last observation, that there is 
some of the requisite “connective tubing” at hand.  The institutions 
that must be designed are financial in nature.  The task is one of 
financial engineering: financial engineering on behalf not simply of 
large firms in this case, but also on behalf of ordinary folk—
”Twos” and “Threes”—as well.  The remainder of this Article will 
undertake to unpack and elaborate upon that suggestion.  The key 
is to start with a familiar means by which the United Kingdom and 
the United States already endeavor to make “capital” owners of 
“laborers,” to employ the classical terminology, and then to adapt 
the structure to our present purpose.  This Article will do that in 
 
48 One might seek to escape the prescriptive indeterminacy by falling back 
upon a maximizing rule, of course, as countenanced above in the Introduction; 
but then one will have relinquished the effort to conform one’s prescriptions to 
what is distributively just. 
 49 Trivalent because, for the purposes of assessing the transfers, “Twos” and 
“Threes” can be lumped together as those whose holding of the global 
endowment of ethically exogenous “stuff” is just about right.  It is the “Ones” and 
the “Fours” who are the real “outliers”―those with much more and much less, 
respectively, of their pro rata entitlements.  The “two-valued formulae,” then, are: 
“Ones” as compared to “Twos-and-Threes” in the case of those who 
unequivocally decry globalization, “Twos-and-Threes” as compared to “Fours” in 
the case of those who univocally defend it. 
50 The fuller significance of institutional design as means of more adequately 
addressing normative-theoretical problems is discussed fully in Hockett, Taking 
Distribution Seriously, supra note 10.  This role of the practical in solving even 
theoretical problems should not be surprising when it is normative theory that is 
under consideration.  For normative theory is always at bottom about action.  
Normative theory is a species of what since Aristotle’s day we have called 
“practical reason.” 
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Sections 3 through 5.  Section 6 will then seek to explain why the 
proposal amounts to an ideal means by which the Bretton Woods 
IFIs can play precisely that WTO-complementary role which the 
founders of all three institutions envisaged well over sixty-odd 
years ago.51 
3.  A SUGGESTIVE BUT INCOMPLETE PROTOTYPE:  THE EMPLOYEE 
STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN 
Intriguingly and indeed promisingly, Americans and Britons 
have made some tentative efforts at making capital-owners of 
laborers.  The principal means up to now has been the public 
favoring—mainly the tax-favoring—of employee benefit plans.  In 
the United States, that is done via the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”).52  Yet the ultimate aim, as ERISA’s 
full title suggests, has been mainly to encourage and protect 
investment for one limited purpose:  retirement security.53 
There is one partial exception, however: The employee stock 
ownership plan (“ESOP”), was originally designed, and continues 
to be advocated, at least partly as a means to foster the pre-
retirement owning of firms by employees.  For a number of reasons 
described elsewhere in the Article, and that many others have also 
explained, that is an over-modest aim.54  But here the concern will 
 
51 This Article treats the WTO as the embodiment, more or less, of what the 
Bretton Woods founders envisaged for the then-planned ITO, which had to wait 
50 years for its effective implementation.  See generally Hockett, Macro to Micro to 
“Mission Creep,” supra headnote (discussing international schema created in 
response to global financial crises). 
52 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 
1001 (2000) et seq. [hereinafter cited by ERISA section number].  See also DRUCKER, 
supra note 23; JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT LAW (The Found. Press, Inc. 1990) (discussing a variety of employment 
law topics, including ERISA).  Here the discussion ignores such proposals as that 
to diminish or even eliminate capital gains taxation. Such proposals appear to be 
aimed at―and doubtless would have the effect of―more rewarding of those who 
already own than fostering wider ownership. 
53 Congressional action culminating in the passage of ERISA was precipitated 
by the folding of the Studebaker corporation, which, bankruptcy proceedings 
subsequently discovered, had grossly underfunded, and indeed “raided,” its 
employee pension fund, leaving the suddenly unemployed pensioners doubly 
bereft.  See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 52, at 68–84.  Those familiar with recent 
bankruptcies, particularly in the airline industry, might be tempted to say plus ça 
change. 
54 See Hockett, Of ESOPs, supra headnote, at 914–23 (arguing that ESOPs can 
be part of the method of distributing the benefits of globalization to all citizens). 
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be more with how the aim is affected, and why we seem willing to 
affect it in the manner we do.  For the mechanics and politics here 
would seem to be generalizable in ways that might benefit “Twos” 
and, especially, “Threes.”  The plan here is to exploit that ability to 
be generalized below. 
A preliminary terminological point before proceeding: in 
speaking of ESOPs (“Plans”), one can be speaking of any of several 
distinct but related species of financial arrangement.55  All, as befits 
their shared name and as intimated above, aim to facilitate 
laborers’ acquisition of shares in the firms for which they work.56  
By far the most common such set of arrangements, however, and 
the one that this Article will thus engage, is the so-called 
“leveraged” ESOP.57  This, as the qualifier suggests, is the plan that 
employs credit in the share-acquiring process.58 
3.1 What They Do:  Simple Mechanics and Spread 
The leveraged ESOP works as follows:59  The employing firm 
adopts an ESOP as a sponsored ERISA plan—more specifically, a 
defined contribution plan.60  Like other ERISA plans, the ESOP 
takes the legal form of a trust.61  It is a distinct, even if firm-
 
55 See JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? 
64–84 (1988) (briefly cataloguing ESOP types). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 68–78. 
58 The principal non-credit-employing ESOPs—so-called “non-leveraged 
ESOPs,” “tax-credit ESOPs” (“TRASOPs”), and “payroll ESOPs” (“PAYSOPs”)—
are briefly elaborated id. at 64–84. 
59 The transactions which follow are related, in slightly differing order and 
somewhat less detail, in EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 121–22 (3d ed. 1987). 
60 ERISA § 407(d)(6).  Defined contribution, or “DC” plans, are to be 
distinguished from so-called “defined benefit” or “DB” plans.  The former 
prescribe a schedule of payments made into an account for the benefit of the 
employee, who in turn bears both “upside” gains and “downside” losses realized 
by her investment portfolio over time.  DB plans, by contrast, prescribe payments 
made out to the employee upon her retirement, and the employing firm—or the 
insurance company from whom the firm purchases annuities on behalf of its 
employee beneficiaries—in effect bears the aforementioned upside gains and 
downside losses realized by the fund out of which payments are made. 
61 ERISA § 403(a).  The idea, of course, is both to insulate funds earmarked 
for employees from the other financial operations of the firm, and to afford the 
employee beneficiaries the benefit of fiduciary obligations owed to them by the 
plan’s trustee.  It is regrettably not clear, however, whether the trust protections 
offered employees by pension trusts are as fulsome as those offered to 
beneficiaries of other trusts.  See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litigation, 263 
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sponsored and ultimately board-directed, entity formed to acquire 
and hold stock on behalf of employees.  Its administrator, although 
named and directed by the sponsoring firm’s board or a firm-
chosen committee,62 accordingly bears fiduciary obligations to 
those employees.63 
To begin with, the trust borrows funds from a bank or other 
commercial lender partly in exchange for a promissory note.64  It 
uses the funds to purchase stock issued by the 
sponsoring/employing firm at fair market value.65  The loan 
proceeds accordingly pass through the ESOP to the 
sponsoring/employing firm itself—the firm finances it—and the 
stock is then held in trust on behalf of the employees.  The firm 
guarantees repayment of the loan by the ESOP to the lender, and 
the stock held in the ESOP is itself pledged as security. 
Over time the sponsoring/employing firm makes regular cash 
contributions to the ESOP, just as in any other kind of defined 
contribution plan.  In this case, the contributions are used by the 
ESOP to amortize the loan originally used to purchase the 
sponsoring/employing firm’s shares.66  As the loan is thus paid 
down, stock held by the trust is steadily released from its loan-
securing role to individual accounts maintained severally on behalf 
of the employee/beneficiaries.67  The proportions in which it is 
 
F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that ERISA defines “fiduciaries,” 
“fiduciary functions,” and “fiduciary duties” more narrowly than does common 
law trust doctrine).  See also infra note 84 for cases regarding the fiduciary duty of 
ESOP trustees under ERISA. 
62 ERISA § 403(a)(1).  A partial exception, which need not here detain us, is 
found at ERISA § 403(a)(2). 
63 ERISA § 404(a)(1). 
64 Only “partly” for reasons that will be made plain over the next several 
sentences. 
65 Because the shares are purchased at fair market value, the purchase is 
sometimes misleadingly described by ESOP-proponents as an equity injection.  In 
actuality, it is publicly subsidized debt financing, accompanied by a stock 
giveaway. 
66 So the sponsoring/employing firm is, in effect, both borrowing and 
paying back on behalf of employees for the purchase of its own stock—it gives out 
partial ownership of itself as an employee benefit.  This dilutes the stake of 
previous owners—more on this presently. 
67 Typically the shares become transferable or redeemable only upon 
retirement or exit of the firm, and typically the firm buys them back.  There are 
voting restrictions (even to the vanishing point) as well, as will be shown 
presently.  That is all significant when it comes to the question of just what 
“owning” should mean here, but it is not the subject of this Article.  For more on 
that question, see Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote. 
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released to those accounts track the beneficiaries’ labor-patronage 
of the sponsoring firm (their wages or salaries).  Diagrammatically, 
things look like this: 
FIGURE 1:  FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A LEVERAGED ESOP 
ARRANGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Not surprisingly, in view of the arrangement’s financial 
structure,68 this all proves to work rather well as a method of 
getting more “capital into the hands of labor” (not to mention more 
debt financing to the firm, as will be shown presently).  Some 
statistics are telling:  By 1986, twelve years after ESOPs had gained 
congressional endorsement in ERISA, nearly five thousand firms 
 
68 With one possible—though minimal—caveat to be noted below, the 
employee/beneficiaries neither pay nor pledge anything.  The firm, in effect, does 
it all (or nearly all, as the government’s role will show). 
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had adopted leveraged ESOP plans.69  About twenty-five percent 
of those plans held more than twenty-five percent of the 
outstanding stock of their firms, and nearly two percent of them 
owned all such stock.70  By 1990, over twelve million laborers—
about ten percent of the workforce—in over ten thousand firms 
had come to participate in ESOPs.71 
By the late 1990s, ESOPs were estimated to account for almost 
four percent of corporate equity-holding in the United States.72  
Moreover, the rate of ESOP growth, by this point had come to 
average between three hundred and six hundred new plans per 
year, accounting for between three hundred thousand and six 
hundred thousand new employee participants per year.73  Some of 
the sponsoring firms over the past thirty years have been such 
familiar American stalwarts as Avis, Chicago Tribune, Delta, 
Federal Express, General Motors, Kraft, Maytag, Polaroid, Procter 
& Gamble, Quaker Oats, United Airlines, and Xerox.74  Even  
 
 
 
69 HANSMANN, supra note 19, at 105. 
70 Id. 
71 See, e.g., id. at 105 (describing the proliferation of ESOPs since the 1970s); 
Corey Rosen, Employee Ownership: Performance, Prospects, and Promise, in 
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 10–11, 20 (Corey Rosen & Karen M. Young 
eds., 1991) (listing firms that participate in ESOPs); Gianna Durson, The Structure 
and Implementation of ESOPs in Public Companies, in THE EXPANDING ROLE OF ESOPS 
IN PUBLIC COMPANIES 11, 23–27 (Karen M. Young ed., 1990) (listing additional 
firms that participate in ESOPs); DAVID P. ELLERMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC WORKER-
OWNED FIRM 110 (1990) (noting the large numbers of ESOPs in the United States).  
ESOP-like structures have made significant headway in non-US jurisdictions as 
well.  See Rosen, supra note 71, at 18–19 (discussing interest in, or attempts to 
implement, ESOPs in firms in other countries).  A helpful catalogue of the 
thousand largest firms with more than four percent employee ownership is found 
in JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASI & DOUGLAS LYNN KRUSE, THE NEW OWNERS 257–301 
(1991).  The catalogue does not disaggregate employee ownership by ESOP, 
profit-sharing, 401(k), and option plans, but is nonetheless suggestive in light both 
of (a) ESOPs’ accounting for slightly less than half of employee-owned equity, and 
(b) the surprising number of firms on the list that are twenty or more percent 
employee-owned. 
72 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, STATISTICAL PROFILE OF 
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (1997) (estimating that nine percent of equity is employee-
owned, with profit-sharing, 401(k), and stock option plans accounting for the non-
ESOP balance).  It should be noted that about four percent of ESOPs are estimated 
to be terminated each year.  Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Rosen, supra note 71, at 10–11, 20; Durson, supra note 71, at 23–27. 
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skeptics of ESOPs, and of the often eccentric financial 
pronouncements of the ESOP’s inventor, Louis Kelso,75 readily 
acknowledge their “rapid proliferation,”76 hence concluding that 
“[s]omething is happening that requires attention.”77  But what is it 
that has been “happening,” and why might it require attention?  
What do the telling statistics actually tell? 
ESOP promoters historically have tended to speak of ESOPs’ 
successes as though all were a “natural” function of superior 
financial engineering, the “self-liquidation” of “capital mortgages,” 
and the incentive effects that growing ownership imparts to 
laborers.  Louis Kelso stated that “the corporation and its 
employees can achieve [through ESOP-financing] several hundred 
percent greater efficiency in the use of corporate earnings for 
capital purposes than through conventional . . . financing.”78  
Similarly, Kelsonian acolyte Stuart Speiser asserted that “th[e] new 
capital . . . pay[s] for itself out of the increased profits flowing from 
expanded production.”79  And the reliably perky business journal, 
Inc., wrote “there’s considerable evidence that eliminating the 
employee mentality and creating companies of businesspeople, of 
owners, has become a kind of Hidden Secret of Success in the 
American marketplace.”80 
 
75 Kelso routinely announced such putative discoveries as “Say’s Law” is 
being “violated” in modern capitalist economies, that contemporary economists 
remain wedded to the labor theory of value, and that there are “two factors” that 
enter into production—capital and labor—with the first of those accounting for an 
ever-growing share of value-added.  See generally Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, 
supra headnote, at 124–42 (providing background on Kelso’s ideas and writings).  
Economists do not appear to have found these discoveries compelling.  It should 
be noted, however, that Kelso’s motives, energy, and inventiveness, as 
distinguished from his sallies into theory, were nothing if not worthy of praise.  
And he was a lawyer and investment banker, not an academic theorist, typically 
pitching his advocacy to legislators and the general public rather than fellow 
theorists.  See generally Speiser, infra note 79. 
76 HANSMANN, supra note 19, at 105. 
77 ELLERMAN, supra note 71, at 120 (emphasis omitted). 
78 LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC 
POWER 62 (1986). 
79 STUART SPEISER, A PIECE OF THE ACTION 429 (1985) (emphasis added).  See 
supra note 76 for more on this “pays for itself” locution. 
80 John Case, A Company of Business People, INC., (Apr. 1993), 
http://www.inc.com/magazine/19930401/3492.html (discussing the growing 
interest in getting employees more involved in managing the business they work 
for). 
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But in fact the mentioned evidence is hardly “considerable”—
at best it is thin and ambiguous.81  Nor does presently leverage-
bought ESOP capital “pay for itself” in much more than a trivial 
sense; it is far from clear that the dividend streams and/or capital 
gains that attend ESOP stock would dependably pay off the term 
loans without help of the kind to be described presently.  And the 
“several hundred percent greater efficiency,” (a quantity which, 
like wearyingly many Kelsonian magnitudes, is arrived at by 
unspecified means) is hardly “natural,” “economic,” or “financial” 
in any pre-legal or pre-political senses of those terms.  For the real 
“Hidden Secret of [ESOPs’] Success,” it turns out, is no more 
obscure than the tax code, ERISA, and combined corporate 
governance and takeover law: The leveraged ESOP as currently 
constituted is essentially a public benefit conferred, like many such 
benefits in the United States, through private channels. 
3.2. How They Do It:  Private Channels, Public Benefits 
The most significant means through which private channels are 
brought into the public benefit are tax and ERISA advantages.  
These two factors, working in tandem, account both for the 
aforementioned “greater efficiency” of ESOPs as financing tools 
and for ESOP stock’s seeming capacity to “pay for itself.”  They 
also afford incentives to the lenders themselves, as well as to non-
ESOP shareholders from whom an ESOP might seek shares.  This 
Article will examine each in turn. 
3.2.1. Tax Advantages 
Probably the most efficacious tax advantage that leveraged 
ESOPs uniquely confer upon sponsoring/employing/issuing firms 
is that the Internal Revenue Code allows firms to deduct 
contributions made to their plans.  The firm may deduct those 
contributions, to an amount up to twenty-five percent of all 
compensation paid to a plan’s participants, from its taxable 
income.82  That advantage works jointly with ERISA’s relaxation, in 
 
81 See BLASI, supra note 55, at 25–27, 221–38 for plenary—and not 
unsympathetic—discussion of what evidence there is. 
82 I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A)(i)(I).  ESOPs enjoy other tax advantages enjoyed by 
employee pensions more generally, most of which are noted below, but this 
Article’s focus will nevertheless be primarily upon what is unique to ESOPs. 
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the case of ESOPs, of the now-customary mandatory-
diversification understanding of the so-called “prudent investor” 
standard to which employee pension trusts ordinarily are subject.  
In non-ESOP cases, ERISA requires that employee trusts be 
broadly invested; a plan will not typically be permitted to hold 
much of the sponsoring firm’s equity.83  ESOPs, however, are 
exempted from this standard,84 meaning that the firm which 
sponsors a leveraged ESOP can eat the cake and keep the penny.  It 
enjoys the tax favor bestowed upon contributions to its ERISA 
plans by further financing itself through new share issuance. 
The aforementioned “further financing”—the “purchase” of 
newly issued shares by the legally distinct trust for the 
employees—as noted, is leveraged.  This simply means that the 
firm is effectively financing itself with debt while enjoying a 
publicly afforded tax break in return for affording employees new 
stock.  As it happens, the lender supplying the leverage for ESOPs 
receives tax benefits too.  Ordinarily, the lender’s taxable income is 
the interest received on lent funds,85 but on a loan to a leveraged 
ESOP, fifty percent of that interest historically has been excluded.86  
Thus in effect, the legislated favors conferred upon ESOPs amount 
to significantly government-subsidized debt-financing of ESOP-
sponsoring firms, in a manner intended to encourage those firms to 
make partial firm owners of firm employees. 
 
83 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C). 
84 ERISA § 404(a)(2).  At least that is ordinarily the case.  Courts have in some 
instances agreed with the Department of Labor that there can be circumstances in 
which the prudent investor standard would require the ESOP trustee to refrain 
from purchasing employer stock.  See, e.g., Herman v. NationsBank Trust Co., 126 
F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that ESOP trustee had duty to act prudently 
with shares, even if that action went against a provision of the ESOP); Moench v. 
Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that, because ERISA and ESOPs 
sometimes have competing goals, the actions of fiduciaries of ESOPs regarding 
shares will be subject to an abuse of discretion standard); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 
F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that courts will presume that ESOP fiduciaries’ 
decisions to remain invested in employer stock is reasonable, although it may be 
challenged).  It should also be pointed out that any other assets in which the ESOP 
might invest remain subject to the general diversification requirement, ERISA § 
404(a)(1). 
85 I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (including “interest” in the general definition of gross 
income). 
86 I.R.C. § 133(a).  But see Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-188, §§ 1602(a), 1602(c), I.R.C. § 164 (repealing the interest exclusion 
previously allowed under I.R.C. § 133(a) for all securities acquisition loans made 
after August 20, 1996, except for loans made pursuant to a binding written 
contract which was in effect before June 10, 1996). 
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There is more:  ordinarily, dividends paid out to the holders of 
firms’ shares are drawn from firms’ after-tax incomes.87  Dividends 
paid on the stock held in an ESOP, however, are deductible from 
taxable corporate income.88  Capital gains reaped by the trust also 
go untaxed; they are deferred compensation.89  The tax code also 
affords incentives to non-ESOP shareholders to transfer their 
shares to the ESOP.  First, under specified conditions a shareholder 
in the sponsoring firm who sells shares to the ESOP may defer any 
taxable gain that she gleans through the sale.90  Second, fifty 
percent of the proceeds from sale of a sponsoring firm’s stock to its 
ESOP are excludable from estate taxation.91  Finally, a decedent’s 
estate may avoid tax-induced liquidity problems by shedding a 
portion of its estate tax liability to an ESOP, provided that it 
convey to that ESOP shares in the sponsoring firm of equal value 
in exchange.92 
3.2.2. Additional ERISA Advantages 
In addition to the just noted tax advantages, there are further 
ERISA advantages designed to encourage ESOP share-acquisitions 
from non-ESOP shareholders in the sponsoring firm.  Pension 
plans ordinarily are barred from purchasing sponsoring firms’ 
shares not only from the sponsoring firms themselves, but also 
from all so-called “parties in interest”—directors, officers, and 
principal shareholders.93  ERISA, however, exempts ESOPs from 
that standard.94  ESOPs also may borrow from such parties in 
 
87 This is true based on the revenue code’s definition of corporate taxable 
“income.”  See I.R.C. § 311(a) (providing that a corporation may not deduct 
dividends from its gross income). 
88 I.R.C. § 404(k). 
89 I.R.C. § 501(a), (c), (d).  This advantage is not unique to ESOPs as 
distinguished from other ERISA plans. 
90 I.R.C. § 1042(b)(1)–(2).  Among the conditions are provisions stipulating 
that proceeds of the sale must be reinvested within one year in a domestic 
corporation, and that after the sale the ESOP will own at least thirty percent of the 
sponsoring firm’s shares. 
91 I.R.C. § 2057 (repealed 1989). 
92 I.R.C. § 2210 (repealed 1989). 
93 I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A). 
94 26 U.S.C. § 408(e). 
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interest in order to acquire employing firms’ stock.95 
3.2.3. Publicly Conferred Governance Advantages 
There is more to the public benefit story than just tax and 
ERISA inducements.  A cluster of governance advantages offered by 
ESOPs, in this case working through (publicly afforded) corporate 
and securities law, offer incumbent managers and otherwise 
satisfied shareholders96 an added array of incentives.  The firm’s 
immediate issuance of new shares to a nominally independent 
“third party” ESOP dilutes more than the monetary value of older 
shares; it dilutes older shares’ voting power as well.97  This 
decrease in voting power makes it more difficult for unsolicited 
would-be acquirers to assemble a controlling bloc of shares.  Most 
importantly, the Delaware Chancery has held that this issuance 
legally can in fact be immediate, indeed even in express 
contemplation of an impending takeover bid.98 
If new employee/owners reliable voting allies of would-be 
firm-acquirers, the ESOP’s promise as a takeover defense would be 
attenuated.  In actuality, however, new employee/owners do not 
ally themselves, interests-wise, with potential hostile acquirers.  In 
any event, employee preferences scarcely matter because 
employee/beneficiaries rarely receive voting rights ab initio.99  That 
 
95 26 U.S.C. § 408(b)(3), I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3). 
96 Including many newly owning employees, were they able to vote their 
shares (discussed infra). 
97 I say “nominally” independent here partly owing to several ESOP 
governance features to be noted presently, and partly owing to the role of the 
sponsoring firm’s board in selecting and directing, indeed even functioning as, the 
ESOP trustee, see infra note 104. 
98 See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 290–91 (Del. 
Ch. 1989) (denying an injunction to halt the issuance of stock because the 
company’s action was a good-faith, reasonable defense to a takeover).  But see 
NCR Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 761 F. Supp. 475, 501–03 (S.D. Ohio 1991) 
(holding that the plan was unenforceable because the primary purpose of the 
ESOP was to thwart a takeover, not to provide for employees’ retirement). 
99 A few details are in order here.  Most stock held by ESOPs considered in 
aggregate is nonvoting stock: the median ESOP holds ten percent of its 
sponsoring firm’s shares, but only five percent of that firm’s voting rights.  See 
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF ESOP TAX INCENTIVES FOR BROADENING STOCK OWNERSHIP 
39–40 (GAO/PEMD-87-8 1986) (“. . . some of the stock held by ESOPs does not 
carry voting rights.”).  How can this be?  Partition the class of ESOPs into those 
sponsored by closely held firms and those sponsored by publicly traded firms.  
Consider the first of those subclasses.  With little exception, closely held 
sponsoring firms enjoy all applicable ESOP tax benefits even if their ESOPs do not 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
132 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:1 
 
in itself constitutes, of course, another incentive for ESOP-creation, 
an incentive enjoyed by the managers.  ESOPs therefore provide 
yet another benefit: managers would not have to deal with 
dissatisfied shareholders, including employee shareholders.  It is 
thus more than likely that the ESOP’s utility in warding off 
takeovers and enhancing managerial freedom of action might also 
account in significant measure for ESOPs’ proliferation.  Utility 
itself, like the favorable tax and ERISA treatment, amounts to a 
public benefit.  It is sanctioned and indeed affirmatively 
encouraged by both legislation and court decision. 
3.2.4. Bringing It All Together:  A Telling Counterfactual 
It surely cannot be objectionable, then, to suggest that the 
legislative and judicial favoring of ESOPs—hence ESOPs’ 
amounting to a public benefit—might be playing a role in their 
spread.100  A stylized scenario may a fortiori sharpen, supplement, 
and stylize how government favoring spurs the growth of ESOPs. 
Assume, arguendo, that the financing of firms via ESOPs is not 
favored by the tax code, ERISA, or any other means, and that the 
same loan on the same terms can be otherwise obtained.  Also 
assume that ESOPs offer no governance or takeover-avoidance 
advantages, and that employees do not temper their wage 
demands by dint of their ESOP benefit; their new shares are “all 
gravy.”  Lastly, suppose that the laborers’ gradually growing 
 
pass acquired stock voting rights through to employee/beneficiaries.  The only 
exception is voting on “fundamental” transactions—matters which must, 
according to charter or applicable law, be decided by supermajorities of 
outstanding shares voted.  See I.R.C. §§ 409(e)(3), 401(a)(22) (including matters 
such as “approval or disapproval of any corporate merger or consolidation, 
recapitalization, reclassification, liquidation, dissolution, sale of substantially all 
assets of a trade or business, or such similar transaction as the Secretary may 
prescribe in regulations”).   
 Next, consider the second subclass.  While in the case of publicly held firms 
voting rights must be passed through to the employee/beneficiaries, it is so only 
in respect to stock actually allocated to employee accounts.  See generally I.R.C. § 
4975(e)(7) (defining ESOPs).  Allocation, however, occurs only gradually as the 
original loan is amortized.  Note also that this lack of control rights ought to give 
pause to those who would see in the current “ESOP revolution” any real 
harbinger of an incipient “workplace democracy.” 
100 I am by no means the first to suggest the importance of public support for 
the spread.  See, e.g., BLASI, supra note 55, at 64–84 (cataloguing ESOP types and 
their benefits); HANSMANN, supra note 19 (noting the rapid expansion of ESOPs 
and their benefits for employees); ELLERMAN, supra note 71, at 110 (observing the 
significant impact of growing ESOPs). 
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“ownership” does not appreciably boost shop floor morale, nor 
does it consequently bolster productivity and firm profitability. 
Under these circumstances, what would happen in Figure 1, 
above?  The firm, via the ESOP, would finance its projects by 
borrowing and repaying, while issuing new stock to employees 
who pay nothing.  This would mean, however, that the value of 
pre-ESOP shares is diluted by the value of the newly issued ESOP 
shares, with no offsetting advantages enjoyed by the pre-ESOP 
shareholders.  Why would the latter not object? 
It is tempting to think there are less proximate political 
answers—discussed momentarily—but the most immediate reason 
is that several of the foregoing suppositions do not obtain.  There 
are considerable tax, ERISA, and governance advantages gained 
through ESOPs.  There is also some evidence that employees do 
temper wage demands in view of the ESOP benefit—that there 
might even be an implicit bargain to this effect—but this can be no 
more than a small part of the story.101 
Only the supposition that growing ownership fails to 
significantly impact productivity appears valid in light of extant 
evidence.  Ergo, tax, ERISA, and governance advantages—the 
cluster of public benefits—enjoyed by ESOPs must surely be 
critical to their spread.  Pre-ESOP shareholders, at least the less 
other-regarding ones,102 are, notwithstanding their self-concern, 
willing to endure the dilution of their shares wrought by leveraged 
ESOP transactions.  They are willing to do so precisely because the 
now much cheaper (due to favorable treatment by tax provisions 
and ERISA) debt-financed firm is sufficiently more valuable, in 
consequence, as to offset partly or wholly the dilution.  To 
whatever degree those shareholders are not wholly compensated 
in this way, the control benefits imparted by ESOPs to 
 
101 For one thing, the evidence is scant.  See ELLERMAN, supra note 71, at 90 
(discussing trade-offs in political democracies), BLASI, supra note 55, at 263 
(detailing the relationship between retained earnings and funding for ESOPs).  As 
a theoretical matter it seems highly unlikely that rational employees would be 
willing to reduce their wages sufficiently to offset the dilution.  The diluting 
shares issued to them are, after all, deferred compensation which confers none of 
the consumption benefits of control.  Additionally, they are undiversified 
investments.  It would be far more sensible for employees willing to sacrifice pay 
for stock to insist upon voting and/or diversified stock.  Hence, they would not 
offer any sacrifices sufficient to offset the dilution of their own firms’ owners’ 
stock. 
102 See infra Section 3.3.  The other-regarding ones might partly be actuated by 
ideological/political motivations. 
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management make up the difference; any dissatisfied shareholders 
are weakened by the court-sanctioned ESOP transactions. 
3.3. Why We Like Them:  Accounting for the Favor 
The (plausible) assumption that law-conferred tax, ERISA, and 
governance benefits constitute a, if not the, critical reason for 
ESOPs’ proliferation, raises another question: Why is this public 
favoring of ESOPs politically accepted and even endorsed in the 
United States?  Does the support not tamper with “natural” market 
forces, and is distortion of this sort not disfavored by many well-
to-do Americans?103  It is tempting to think that those who would 
seek to render global trade and investment liberalization more 
justly to all the world’s inhabitants shall find the successes of 
ESOPs instructive.  The mutually reinforcing ethical and 
endowment-psychological reasons appear to account for the 
United States’ public and private favoring of ESOPs. 
3.3.1 Core Values:  Responsibility and Equal Opportunity 
The key to the ESOP’s political success probably lies in its 
giving expression to a cluster of interlinked ethical-cum-political 
values and endowment-psychological dispositions that are shared 
by a broad swath of Americans and, there is good reason to 
believe, persons worldwide.104  Values-wise, most people are 
opportunity-egalitarian in their commitments.105  We believe that 
what people have should ideally be traceable to equal initial 
holdings of such ethically exogenous resources—favors of fortune, 
 
103 Certainly some seem to think so.  See, e.g., Michael W. Melton, 
Demythologizing ESOPs, 45 TAX L. REV. 363, 363–64 (1990) (arguing that ESOPs do 
not efficiently achieve capital formulation, wealth redistribution, and other goals);  
Richard L. Doernberg & Jonathan R. Macey, ESOPs and Economic Distortion, 23 
HARV. J. LEGIS. 103, 103 (1986) (claiming that ESOPs cause inefficient market 
distortion due to overly strict regulations in ESOP legislation). 
104 For more on the invariance of these dispositions across cultures and 
subcultures, see, for example, Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra 
note 10, for a description of common intuitions of distributive justice, and 
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 10, for a description of how the 
concept of distribution should be treated in law and economic literature. 
105 See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra, headnote, at 31–51 (arguing that 
most people support a norm of parity and fairness vis-á-vis goverment); Hockett, 
Jeffersonian Republic, supra headnote, at 57–68 (noting that it may now be possible 
to design an equal “ownership society” in agricultural, commercial, and industrial 
spheres); see also Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote, at 93 (describing the 
Bretton Woods Institutions as supportive of equality of opportunity). 
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of chance or mere circumstance, the global “stuff” of Section 1—as 
no one now living is responsible for having created.  They believe 
that people’s success should ideally be traceable to equal initial 
holdings of ethically exogenous resources such as favors of 
fortune, chance, or mere circumstance, not to be dictated by the 
machinations of anyone presently living.106  It is believed that 
departures from that baseline ideally would be the product of 
value-additive or -detractive effort—of choice rather than chance—
for which people are responsible.107 
It is tempting to think of access to value-adding opportunity—
to business capital as well as to dwelling space and basic human 
capital—as part of that ethically exogenous endowment to which 
all should ideally enjoy access.108  Ethical intuitions such as these 
underwrite the first several assumptions, noted in Section 1, 
implicit in the thinking of many who find globalization ethically 
perplexing. 
3.3.2. Endowment Dispositions:  Loss Aversion and “Handout” 
Aversion 
Endowment-psychological dispositions-wise, people are apt to 
experience some methods of redressing imbalances in the 
distribution of that aforementioned exogenous endowment as less 
discomfiting than others.109  For example, individuals’ more 
instinctively self-regarding, less reflectively ethical selves, are 
prone to feel friendlier toward distributing apparently “new” 
resources to the presently under-endowed than toward “taking” 
already held resources from the over-endowed for redistributive 
purposes.110  Those same less reflective selves will tend to regard a 
perceived “refraining from taking” from the under-endowed as 
 
106 See sources cited supra note 105. 
107 See sources cited supra note 105. 
108 See sources cited supra note 105. 
109 See Hockett, Whose Ownership?,  supra headnote, at 58–72, 80–87 (observing 
that most people support giving to the “have-nots,” though not necessarily at the 
expense of “haves”); Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra headnote, at 73–83 
(describing support in American political traditions for an “efficient equal-
opportunity republic”). 
110 See sources cited supra note 109.  I employ scare-quotes here to register the 
fact that the “newness” and “taking” in question are experienced as such pre-
reflectively, as their proceeding from cognitive dispositions would suggest.  I am 
speaking of predisposed framings here rather than considered judgments. 
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preferable to a mere “giving” to the same.111  Finally, individuals, 
in their more self-regarding moments, will generally be more 
amenable to any perceived “giving” to the degree that it can be 
plausibly framed as an earned rewarding of—hence as ethically 
endogenized, or deserved by—the recipient.112 
Such are the “spoons full” of endowment-psychological 
“sugar,” that typically “make the medicine” of redressing justicial 
imbalance “go down.”113  This is not a matter of “fooling 
ourselves” or the citizenry, or of acting with less than an honest 
transparency.114  It is simply a matter of making deliberate 
accommodation, in the interest of acting justly, with those pre-
reflective perceptual tendencies that most people, on reflection, 
recognize to be instinctively active in much of their pre-
deliberative cognition.  The apt comparison here would be to 
Ulysses, who, in contemplation of the sirens ahead, asked to be 
bound to the mast.115 
3.3.3. How the SOP Structure Conforms 
The leveraged ESOP coheres nicely with the values and 
dispositions just rehearsed.  It spreads a basic endowment which is 
not difficult to view as being, at least in part or potential, ethically 
exogenous.116  The leveraged ESOP spreads that endowment by 
distributing what can saliently, if nevertheless superficially, be 
viewed as “new” capital—newly issued shares in firms.117  It does 
that partly in what resembles a return for reward-earning effort—
 
111  See sources cited supra note 109.  Scare-quotes are used in a similar 
manner as those in the text accompanying the previous footnote. 
112  See sources cited supra note 109. 
113 Apologies, of course, to Mary Poppins and her creators. 
114 Thanks to Joel Trachtman and Annelise Riles in particular for pressing me 
on this matter of transparency. 
115 Apologies this time to Homer; and to Jon Elster.  See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES 
AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1979). 
116 It is in part or potential ethically exogenous in two senses; one trivial, the 
other less so.  First, one must use it responsibly in order to derive “utility” from it; 
it is a kind of resource.  Second and less trivially, the quantum of this resource 
that one has is at least in part—and sometimes indeed in significant part—the 
product of fortune or fate rather than effort.  One can hold less than another 
simply by dint of having been born to the wrong parents.  See generally Hockett, 
Whose Ownership?, supra headnote, at 31–51 (describing different political 
perceptions about, and opinions on, the U.S. “ownership society”). 
  117 “Superficially” in light of what was observed supra, Section 3.2. 
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labor patronage or work for the firm.118  The leveraged ESOP 
encourages such private rewarding (on the part of lenders and 
otherwise-diluted shareholders) largely by refraining from 
perceived taking (i.e., through tax breaks) rather than overt taking 
and giving. 
 The leveraged ESOP replicates, in piecemeal and only 
somewhat more convoluted fashion, the same strategies that the 
United States has employed most elegantly in connection with 
publicly facilitated home-spreading and education-spreading since 
the early- to mid-twentieth century.119  This appears to be no 
accident, for there is considerable historical evidence suggesting 
that the ESOP was expressly inspired by the federal home finance 
programs set in place over the 1930s and 1940s.120  There is also 
good evidence that both these and the federal education finance 
programs set in place over the 1960s and 1970s appealed to 
legislators and the public alike precisely because of their resonance 
with the values and dispositions just rehearsed.121 
But then this raises a further question:  might the idea of the 
leveraged ESOP itself be leveraged yet further, in a manner that 
links global “Ones,” “Twos,” “Threes,” and “Fours” in a manner 
enabling “Twos” and “Threes” to be compensated by “Ones” at no 
expense to “Fours”?  Might the salience of the employment relation 
that appears to ethically underwrite the ESOP’s popularity carry 
over to more attenuated, even severed, employment relations?  
More ambitiously, might the ESOP be adapted in a manner that 
ultimately makes all global residents part-owners of most of the 
world economy’s large firms?  It would seem that it might, and this 
Article now turns to that prospect. 
4. MORE SOPS FOR MORE PERSONS:  ADAPTING THE STRUCTURE TO 
ADDITIONAL PATRONAGE FORMS 
It should be remembered that labor with a firm—the 
employment relation—is an ethically salient patronage relation.122  
 
118 That is to say it is viewed as an “employee benefit,” as something 
predicated upon lengthy labor-patronage for—a kind of “loyalty to”—the firm.  
More on this infra, Sections 4, 5. 
119 See Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra headnote, at 98–120, 143–53. 
120 Id. at 135–37. 
121 Id. at 98–120, 143–53. 
122 So far as I have been able to determine, the only scholar who has devoted 
much discussion to the relations between patronage and firm ownership is 
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Labor is an ongoing mode of relation between persons and firms,123 
and it is a mode of relation that appears to sanction the conferral of 
benefits upon persons.124  It renders the latter apparently earning 
or deserving of the benefits bestowed upon labor through 
 
Hansmann.  See HANSMANN, supra note 19 (exploring different schemes for 
ownership of various firm types).  However, my use of the concept of patronage 
will be somewhat more elastic than Hansmann’s—as it is perhaps intimated by 
my addition of the qualifier “ethically salient.”  My understanding of the term will 
accordingly be a bit different as well.  I do not believe, however, that my  
 
understanding and employment of the term will be incompatible with 
Hansmann’s.  See supra notes 111–12 for an example of my use of the term. 
123 Hansmann appears to be less explicitly concerned with the “ongoingness” 
of patronage relations, while being more explicitly concerned with a particular 
species of relating to the firm—namely, selling to or purchasing from it—than I.  
See supra note 118.  I think our distinct concerns with patronage are nonetheless 
compatible, however.  First, my concern with the possible ethical salience of 
patronage naturally lends itself to an emphasis upon longer-term relations, at 
least among those who purchase from or contribute to firms in small increments 
per transaction.  (Duration of relations substitutes for magnitude of individual 
transaction.)  Second, patronage relations, as potentially involving more than 
purchasing and selling alone, are implicit in Hansmann’s own understanding of 
the term, because the occasional recourse to the broader relational concept of 
“supplying” figures prominently in Hansmann’s treatment of stock-holders as 
financial capital suppliers.  HANSMANN, supra note 19, at 12–16. 
124 Hansmann defines “patrons” as “persons who transact with a firm either 
as purchasers of the firm’s products or as sellers to the firm of supplies, labor, or 
other factors of production.”  HANSMANN, supra note 19, at 12.  Much of the thrust 
of Hansmann’s often astonishingly insightful monograph is devoted to showing 
both (a) that it is typically a particular class of patrons which owns most of the 
firms operating within a particular industry, and (b) why it is that the particular 
classes which tend to own in particular industries end up being the more efficient 
owners.  My interest in this Article, though not incompatible with Hansmann’s 
interest, is nonetheless distinct.  The distinction accounts for my somewhat 
broadened understanding and employment of the concept of patronage.  My 
concern is with patronage as a form of ongoing relation between persons and 
firms, such as can be viewed in part as the patron’s consistent conferral of some 
manner of benefit upon the firm. This can in turn engage our willingness to view 
the patron’s coming to own a share of the firm as ethically unobjectionable—as 
something better than the product of a mere handout.  That is to say my angle on 
patronage here is as a “desert basis” in the sense described supra, note 169.  I do 
not believe that this basis for interest in patronage places me at odds with 
Hansmann’s efficiency-grounded basis for interest in the same; I do not here 
suggest that firms should be owned by patrons of a different kind than those that 
he shows to be the more efficient owners of firms in particular industries.  Rather, 
I simply propose that more patrons within the class be added to the rosters of 
owners.  The remainder of this Section will both make this plain and unpack more 
fully the ways in which patronage relations might be seen as ethically 
underwriting benefit-conferrals upon current non-owners within patronage 
classes. 
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leveraged ESOP financing.125  That was one upshot of Section 3.3 
above. 
 
Yet labor is but one way in which people continually relate 
themselves to firms.  This raises an intriguing prospect:  perhaps a 
new method might rely upon patronage relations in addition to, or 
that vary upon, the employment relation in order to warrant the 
public facilitation of share-spreading—in particular, to those called 
“Peters,” or “Twos” and “Threes” above.  This Section proposes 
and assesses a few possibilities, meant to be suggestive rather than 
exhaustive. This Article will take a brief sequence of suggestive 
steps to approach the proposed plan. 
4.1. A First, Simple Variant:  Customer Stock Ownership Plans 
One conspicuous form of patronage, in some respects 
reminiscent of labor, is ongoing customer-ship.126  Some firms from 
which customers purchase goods and services are the firms from 
which these customers regularly purchase them.  In some cases that 
consistency is attributable to something like customer loyalty—an 
investment of trust, rather than labor, in the firm.  In other cases 
the “loyalty” is perhaps not voluntary, but instead reflects a lack of 
available alternatives—the customer is held hostage, so to speak.  
And there are of course middling cases between the extremes, such 
as unthinking habit or ignorance of alternative supply sources.  In 
all such cases, however, it is plausible that the relation is 
sufficiently salient, from an ethical point of view, as to warrant at 
least some degree of public facilitation for patrons to gradually 
come to own parts of the firms that they regularly patronize.127 
 
125 Please see the discussion in Section 3.3, supra, which suggests reasons why 
ESOPs are publicly favored. 
126 Indeed, in some industries customers constitute the most efficient class of 
firm owners.  Examples are the farm supply industry, in which consumer 
cooperatives constitute an oft-encountered firm form; rural electricity, in which 
customer cooperatives again figure prominently; clubs that afford their members 
high-status “associative goods,” which again tend to be owned by their members; 
and urban housing, in which housing cooperatives figure prominently.  See 
generally HANSMANN, supra note 19, at 149–223 (detailing customer-owned 
industries and firm types). 
127 Again, sometimes this happens quite “naturally,” for reasons that appear 
to be rooted in the comparative efficiencies of governance and contracting.  See 
source cited supra note 109.  But the reasons for interest in an “ownership society” 
warrant considering the fostering of ownership even where it does not quite 
“naturally” arise, which of course seems to be what has occurred in the case of 
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Consider a homespun example: there might be a small 
university town, centrally located, hence perhaps geographically 
isolated, in a large U.S. state.128  People who live and work in the 
town see a lot of each other, and consequently come to feel a 
palpable sense of community.  They feel this not only in relation to 
one to another, but also in relation to the relatively small number 
of retail establishments that sell to the townspeople.  Buyers and 
sellers are thrown all together, feel “centrally isolated” together, 
and perhaps miss this feeling when they are away. 
Then a remarkable new grocery store complex comes to this 
town.129  Everyone talks about the new store, even showing it off to 
visitors and prospective new residents.  They are as proud as they 
are pleased that at long last it has arrived.130  Nearly everyone 
living or working within several miles of the town now purchases 
groceries at this complex, does dry cleaning there, does their 
banking there, and even leaves their children to be attended there 
while shopping.  Things might develop and go on in this way for 
years.  It is an ongoing, multi-faceted, relation. 
Now suppose the recently floated American idea of an 
“ownership society” is found to be an attractive one, for any 
number of reasons,131 and thus it is considered good public policy 
 
ESOP proliferation.  See supra Section 3 (describing how ESOPs operate). Those 
same reasons presumably afford at least a preliminary answer to prospective 
objections rooted in the same normative source as familiar objections to 
disgorgement remedies in contract, owing to their inefficiently coupling 
purchases with investments in firms.  See Hockett, sources cited supra headnote.  
Thank you to Daniel Markovits for pressing me here. 
128 I am thinking of Ithaca, NY, where I live.  But there are countless similarly 
situated locales, not all of them university towns and not all of them as relatively 
isolated as Ithaca.  Indeed, this example might also be plausibly applied to a 
community-like neighborhood or sector of a large city, such as is commonly 
found in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles.  Yet please bear in mind that the 
example following this one will make no reference to community-like towns at all.  
All examples in this Article are meant to be illustrative and suggestive, even to 
spur additional visualizations; they do not purport to be exclusive or exhaustive. 
129 I am alluding to Wegman’s in Ithaca NY, a store about which many 
indeed speak with pride.  This firm is not publicly traded, so I am asking that the 
reader pretend that it is. 
130 It is one of those towns that has difficulty attracting and keeping 
nationally or even regionally known merchant establishments. 
131 There are a variety of grounds upon, and the three principal American 
political traditions to which, the notion of an “ownership society” might be 
attractive. See generally Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote, at 5–78. 
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to encourage wider ownership of firms.  In that circumstance, 
might it not be politically acceptable, even attractive, to encourage 
the voluntary spread of shares in this store (or its holding  
 
 
 
company) among the regular customers who live in community 
with, and partly organize their lives around, this store—just as it is 
in the case of employees?  Of course it might.132 
Consider a cognate example, applicable perhaps to not only 
smaller communities but also larger metropolitan areas or wider 
regions.  There might be a product or service with increasing 
returns to scale.  It is a “natural monopoly.”133  Perhaps it is a 
transport system, an electrical power grid or a high-speed internet 
network—a public or publicly regulated utility.  Customers of the 
firms that supply such products and services, whether identified 
by reference to towns, cities or larger regions serviced by these 
firms, might often find themselves more or less “stuck” with their 
suppliers.  They have little choice but to patronize them.  That is a 
large part of why they are regulated.  But might the same rationale 
thus warrant facilitating the customers to gradually come to own 
these suppliers, at least in part?  Surely customer hostage is at least 
as ethically salient a patronage-form as is more voluntary customer 
loyalty. 
Were this line of thinking to be continued, it might be 
worthwhile to consider facilitating patrons’ acquisition of shares in 
the firms—the grocery store or the utility—in much the same way 
 
132 Of course it is not the case that facilitating ownership of local businesses 
will afford optimal diversification.  After all, personal incomes and the incomes of 
town-sharing or region-sharing firms can to some extent co-vary—for example, in 
the case of local or regional slumps.  But I ask that the reader bear with me a bit 
longer.  The examples below show that diversification grows.  Moreover, the aim 
here is to make use of patronage relations as ethically salient grounds for public 
action facilitating ownership, pursuant both (a) to the hypothesis posited supra 
Section 3.3, concerning why the public is willing to subsidize ESOP expansion, 
and (b) to expand the hypotheses of this Article’s predecessor pieces, concerning 
why we have acted similarly to promote home-owning and the spread of higher 
education.  Please note, for a discussion of the project of democratizing income-
risk-sharing across localities and even across nations in a separate article, Hockett, 
Global Macro-Hedging, supra headnote at 212–56.  These pieces read together aim to 
provide at least a rough template for how best to render society more “owning,” 
more risk-spread-efficient, and more just. 
133 In a way, so was the store in the previous example.  Small towns support 
less competition among smallish suppliers than do cities. 
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that share-acquisition in firms by employees is facilitated.  Tax 
breaks could be granted to firms that issue shares to trusts whose 
beneficiaries gradually came to own legally what initially they 
would beneficially own.  (Again, perhaps, as in the labor case, this 
would be in proportion to their patronage—e.g., amounts 
purchased from the firms in place of wages earned working for 
firms.)  In essence, then, the financial structure of the leveraged 
ESOP arrangement would be replicated.  Only the particular 
patronage relation would change.  It could be called a “Customer 
Stock Ownership Plan,” or “CuSOP.”134  Imagine it thus: 
FIGURE 2:  INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A CUSOP 
ARRANGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
134 This SOP is not to be confused with the “consumer stock ownership plan” 
proposed by Kelso, which latter appears to be little more than a producer co-op.  
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 78, at 67–73. 
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Of course, it would be different here relative to the ESOP as 
presently constituted, even apart from the differing patronage 
relation that ethically grounds it.  For example, there is no federal 
“CRISA” for “customer benefit plans” in the way that there is an 
ERISA structure upon which ESOP programs partly are built.  Nor, 
accordingly, does the revenue code currently include any 
provisions that might encourage firm-financing through CuSOPs 
as it does in the case of ESOPs.  But that is all beside the point.  The 
point is that all of the means by which stock-acquisition is 
currently facilitated by employees could be legislatively replicated 
to facilitate stock-acquisition by long-term customers—loyal 
customers, hostage customers, or “in-between” customers.  And 
the public benefit that such legislation would effectively confer—
similar to that which public facilitation of ESOPs confers—would 
be warranted, could be advocated, and presumably would be 
politically embraced, on much the same grounds of ethically 
salient patronage. 
4.2. A Second, Closer Variant:  Rent-Recouping Stock Ownership 
Plans 
One more example draws yet closer to the plan proposed 
below for those “Twos” and “Threes” disproportionately harmed 
by global trade and investment liberalization:  sometimes new 
resources are discovered.  Petroleum reserves are found in Alaska, 
newly exploitable minerals are found in beds of magnesium 
nodules just off the California coast, tar sands are found north of 
Canada, or some portion of the electromagnetic spectrum becomes 
usable in a way that it was not before.  Sometimes no living person 
or group of persons can be credited with the discovery, or with the 
discovery’s full exploitability.  But some person or persons often 
can be partly credited.  In such cases, the “Western,” especially 
“American,” way of doing things is to permit private agents, 
generally firms, to exploit the new possibilities by essentially 
appropriating rents from them.135  Some of the value of the new 
resources, from rents, should flow very quickly into private hands, 
even while not all of that value seems to be deserved by those 
 
135 The justification of appropriable rents for property rights appears to 
originate, at least in its canonical formulation, with Harold Demsetz.  See Harold 
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347 (1967) 
(arguing that property rights are essential for markets to perform efficiently). 
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parties. 
What to do with the surplus?  The “windfall profits” could be 
taxed, but that might resemble a kind of incremental taking,136 and 
the takings go to the government.  Westerners, and especially 
Americans, do not seem to like that kind of taxation anymore.137  
At any rate, they do not find it as palatable as they once did, 
perhaps because they are less trusting of the users of the takings—
”the government”—than they once were.138  Yet many people, 
Americans in particular, still like ownership—very much, in fact—
and they are aware that, by definition, nobody has earned a 
windfall.  So why not widen the distribution of shares in the firms 
authorized to exploit the new opportunities? 
But this still leaves open the question of patronage.  To whom 
should the shares be distributed?  Is there some saliently or 
perceivably “natural” class of patrons whose beneficiary status 
would be as readily warranted as that of employees and long-term 
customers?  After all, it would not be desirable to simply replace 
one class of windfall beneficiaries with another, as if it were at 
random.  How, then, to think about this?  It is tempting to suggest 
a sort of “sliding scale” here.  And indeed this might be a nice way 
to gradually generalize the original ESOP idea to move 
incrementally in the direction of a broad global recognition that 
good citizenship and faultless wage or salary loss themselves 
constitute an ethically salient kind of patronage.139 
For example, some new resources might be broadly perceived 
as bearing some special nexus to the places where they are found.  
 
136 This claim, associated with Richard Epstein, is of course hyperbolic.  But 
one can readily grasp the intuition that underwrites it.  For the hyperbole, see, for 
example, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that many kinds of governmental takings, such 
as progressive and special taxes, may be unconstitutional under a broader 
interpretation of the Takings Clause). 
137 See, for example, id., for a representative screed.  See also MICHAEL J. 
GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING 
INHERITED WEALTH (2005), for a morbidly fascinating, documentary account of the 
exploitation of citizen cognitive error by champions of the tax-evading well-to-do. 
138 I employ scare-quotes here because I am simply conveying, rather than 
participating in, that attitude pursuant to which some view the government as an 
alien force rather than an agent of collective action.  Perhaps the current iteration 
of this line of hostile thinking all began with the disillusionments of the 1960s, 
which seem to have fed directly into the populist “tax revolts” of the 1970s, out of 
which so much of current rightward-leaning ideology seems to have grown. 
139 This suggestion is taken up infra Section 6. 
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Such places, in turn, might be perceived as being somehow 
ethically “closer” or legally “more proximate” to—as it were “more 
owned by”—their residents than by nonresidents.140  
Consequently, new oil found in Alaska might be perceived as 
being somehow more Alaskan than even American.  And Alaskan 
citizens might accordingly be thought to stand in a somewhat—
even if incrementally—closer patronage relation to any firm-
granted rights to exploit new Alaskan oil reserves than are non-
Alaskan Americans.141  After all, Alaska itself is constitutionally 
permitted to tax firms that extract Alaskan oil reserves, even after 
the (federal) IRS has done so.  So it must be the case that citizens of 
political units are somehow viewed as more privileged than 
noncitizens with respect to benefits brought by the resources that 
are found and exploited within the geographic boundaries of those 
 
140 Scare-quotes again indicate that I am attempting to express a pre-reflective 
manner of perception.  I should note here that I am exceedingly uncomfortable 
with this particular perception, and find it to be a compromise with territorialist 
psychological dispositions that are regrettable at best.  But bear with me for a 
moment.  Such primitive intuition like this underwrites the judgment that, for 
example, coal found between Canada and Mexico is “American” coal, rather than 
North American coal or “the coal of mankind.”  While, ideally I would prefer to 
repudiate the intuition, if we are stuck with it then we may as well harness it to 
good purpose. 
141 In 1978 and 1980, voters’ initiatives were introduced to establish the 
Alaska General Stock Ownership Corporation (AGSOC), which would have 
provided Alaskan citizens with ownership interests in the Alaska Oil Pipeline.  
Pursuant to a tentative agreement with the British Petroleum Company, the latter 
was to sell its interest in the Alaska Pipeline to AGSOC.  AGSOC would have 
enjoyed the backing of state credit to borrow.  Under federal matching 
legislation—specifically, Subchapter U of Chapter 1 under Subtitle A of the 
Internal Revenue Code—AGSOC would also have enjoyed favorable federal 
income tax treatment.  See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, 
2892 (1978) (noting the potential creation of a stock ownership corporation).  The 
AGSOC plan also would have prohibited any one individual from taking 
ownership of more than ten shares, in order to prevent concentrated ownership.  
See William Greider,  Alaska Inc: An Economic Experiment, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 
1978, at A1 (describing the planned distribution of wealth from the energy 
development to Alaskan citizens).  The Alaskan ballot measure nevertheless lost 
on a close popular vote (approximately 78,000 to 72,000).  See, for example, the 
Alaskan state government’s website, Initiatives that Have Been on Alaska’s 
Ballots, http://www.elections.alaska.gov/initbal.php (last visited Oct 25, 2008) 
which lists Alaskan ballot initiatives since 1960; see also Elliot Jacobson, Senator 
Gravel Assumes Leadership of “People’s Lobby”!, 1 NATIONAL INITIATIVE FOR 
DEMOCRACY (2002), http://www.ni4d.us/en/nin_1_5/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2008) 
(discussing, in part, Senator Gravel’s involvement in the AGSOC proposal).  
Notwithstanding the failure of the ballot initiative, Alaska did adopt a cognate 
program.  See infra note 144. 
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units.  Cognate observations to these “Alaskan” observations 
might hold true with respect to magnesium nodules found off the 
coast of Washington, Oregon, and California; tar sands found 
north of Canada; and other resources found within the territorial  
 
 
jurisdictions of other political units.  Indeed, international law 
treats things much in this way on a nation-by-nation basis.142 
 Now bring these patronage considerations together with the 
earlier rehearsed “windfall” considerations.  Would it be too far a 
stretch to require, as a condition for granting the firm the rights to 
exploit the new resource, that the firm distribute shares in itself to 
the residents of any municipality or nation-state with which the 
new resource is widely perceived to be especially closely 
associated?  (For example, residents of any municipality or state 
that currently might tax the enterprise that exploits the resources?)  
Note that if the answer is “no, it would not be a stretch,” then tax 
or other incentives might not be needed at all.  Or how about this:  
tax and other incentives are combined with the “carrot” that is the 
prospective new resource exploitation itself, in a manner that 
lessens the former relative to what they were in the ESOP and 
CuSOP cases.  This encourages both (a) the entry of firms to do the 
exploiting, and (b) those firms’ spreading their shares—while 
being less expensively (to the public fisc).  Call it a “RentSOP.”143  It 
might look like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
142 See generally Hockett, Limits, supra headnote. 
143 This is not to be confused with Kelso’s proposed “RECOPs,” “GSOPs,” or 
“COMCOPs,” which, though apparently geared toward spreading ownership of 
some firms cognate with those under consideration here, are both (a) argued for 
on entirely different—indeed, puzzling—grounds, and more importantly (b) 
presumably for that reason, financially structured differently.  See KELSO & KELSO, 
supra note 78, at 75–83, 88–92, 99–103.  For a more general charitable interpretation 
and correction of Kelsonian “theories” and schemes, see Hockett, Jeffersonian 
Republic, supra headnote at 124-42. 
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FIGURE 3:  INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A RENTSOP 
ARRANGEMENT 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
This is the same diagram as Figures 1 and 2, with state or local 
citizens standing in as patrons instead of employees or customers.  
(So now the degree of patronage might track years of residence.)144  
 
144 The matter of crafting terms is ignored for present purposes so as to avoid 
conflict with court decisions overturning state laws burdening interstate travel, 
decided under the Commerce Clause of Article I, the Privileges and Immunities or 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, or some “penumbral 
emanation” from those or other provisions of the U.S. Constitution.  In Zobel v. 
Williams, the Supreme Court rejected Alaskan legislation that awarded pipeline 
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What is different, apart from the changed patronage ethically 
grounding the public benefit, is simply that the tax and other 
benefits afforded by the public are less than before, since the 
exploitation rights are themselves a benefit (that is entailed by the 
“windfall” considerations).  Of course, the loan made to the 
RentSOP trust might have to be participated as well, since possibly 
in this case, unlike the ESOP and CuSOP cases, it would be too 
large for any one lender to make.145  But all of that is neither here 
nor there for present purposes.  The important point is that the 
firm still debt-finances itself on favorable terms in the interest of 
boosting its capacity to exploit the new resources, while also 
spreading ownership in itself—hence the benefits that accrue to its 
owners by dint of its access to the resources. 
Note, by connecting the hope of maximizing both the number 
of possible beneficiaries and the number of firms that those 
beneficiaries might gradually partly own, the understanding of 
“local resource” can be readily broadened.  That is to say, matters 
in this scenario are similarly situated as they were in connection 
with CuSOPs in Section 4.1 above, where candidates for RentSOPs 
can be proliferated. 
The understanding of “local resource” might be broadened 
along at least two dimensions.  First, it is possible to move outward 
from locality to region to nation or economic class, discussed 
 
dividends to state residents based on the duration of their residence up to the 
point at which distributions began. 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982).  But allowing the 
number of shares distributed thenceforth to grow with years of residence would 
not seem to be constitutionally offensive so long as one could begin to accumulate 
shares immediately upon taking up residence.  See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 618 (1969) (establishing a fundamental “right to travel”); Edwards v.  
 
 
California, 314 U.S. 160, 160 (1941) (declaring unconstitutional a law that 
prohibited residents from bringing non-resident “indigent persons” into the 
state). 
145 This is not just as a matter of capacity, but as a matter of law, as well. In 
the United States, for example, the Banking Code’s lending limits could kick-in.  
See 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) (2006) (limiting the amount that banks may loan at a given 
point or to a given individual).  According to the code, the total outstanding non-
fully-secured loans and credit extended by a national banking association to an 
individual, including a trust, must not exceed fifteen percent of that banking 
association’s unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus.  12 U.S.C. § 84 (a)(2) 
additionally requires that total outstanding fully-secured loans and credit 
extensions made by a national banking association not exceed ten percent of the 
association’s unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus. 
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above.  Second, the understanding of “resource” itself can be 
broadened.  As discussed in Section 2, it is not always a matter of 
found objects or substances, after all.  A highly desired set of 
geographic coordinates, for example, might count as well—say, a 
“prime location” upon which some highly remunerative piece of 
commercial real estate stands.  That is a paradigmatic case, in fact, 
of “rent.”  And rentiers who hold exclusionary rights to highly 
desired spaces are rather like the “natural monopolists” considered 
in connection with CuSOPs above at Section 4.1.  This is why the 
so-called “classical” economists, pioneers like Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo, and Henry George, were so suspicious of them.146  But we 
need not be suspicious.  Instead, the spaces’ voluntary sale and 
purchase at fair market value can be facilitated by broad classes of 
locals simply by treating the spaces like oil reserves or magnesium 
nodules, and the firms that operate them like resource-extractors, 
in Figure 3 just above.147  “Don’t get mad,” we might say, “get 
owning.  Get the company.”148 
 
146 See, e.g. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 161–63 (R.H. Campbell, et al., ed., 1976) (describing rent as a 
monopoly price that remains independant of expenses laid out by the rentier); 
DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 33–45 (Dent 
& Sons 1969) (arguing that rentiers are windfall beneficiaries of scarcity). 
147 HANSMANN, supra note 19 at 173–79 (suggesting a number of reasons for 
the absence of urban utility co-ops analogous to rural electrical co-ops, among 
them the comparative transience of urban dwellers relative to rural dwellers and 
conflicts of interest among disparate classes of prospective urban owners).  While 
such phenomena presumably account in part for the absence of spontaneously 
generated (sorry—pun foreseen but not intended) urban utility cooperatives, they 
do not, so far as I can see, stand in the way of publicly facilitated partial 
ownership of corporate utilities by their customers.  Moreover, to whatever degree 
we might worry that partial ownership by customers is “not enough,” we can 
readily mitigate the worry by means familiar to other, existing utilities-ownership 
scenarios.  Hence, rates can be regulated with a view to preventing price-
discrimination as among classes of users. Similarly, any worry over the 
development of, for example, “absentee ownership” in the long run would seem 
to be mitigated by: (a) the fact that highly transient residents of a municipality 
likely will not come to acquire much in the way of shares; (b) the possibility of 
recourse to required redemption—indeed, we might even arrange to have 
transients trade their erstwhile utilities’ shares for shares in utilities located in 
their new locales, with the utilities themselves in turn exchanging the shares; or at 
worst; and (c) the possibility of recourse to mere beneficial ownership by the new 
owners, legal ownership to remain with consumer trusts established for the 
purpose of retained legal ownership.  Indeed, as Hansmann himself points out, 
some municipal utilities can readily be likened to cooperatives, since they are 
organized quite similarly. Id. at 177. 
148 A variation, perhaps, on the 1979 Remington electric razor advertisement, 
in which Victor Kiam averred, “I liked it so much, I bought the company.”  See I 
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Turning from the resource dimension to the locality dimension, 
looking at not only “locally located” resources but also more 
diffuse such resources—e.g., new portions of the electromagnetic 
spectrum—the patronage dimension can be expanded as well.  
There will then be more beneficiaries, meaning more potential 
owner-beneficiaries of the firm’s privileged access.  For example, 
imagine that the United States’ Telecommunications Act of 1996149 
is amended to work somewhat differently than it actually has: 
Congress might not have authorized the FCC simply to grant 
existing broadcast companies new “advanced spectrum,” without 
requiring payment.150  Instead, it might have established a sort of 
“national RentSOP” on behalf of all citizens, and then offered the 
combined inducement of occupancy over the HD bandwidths and 
some (diminished) tax incentives to get the firms to spread shares 
in themselves to the citizenry.  That would not only be a readily 
intuited extension from the more “locally located” RentSOP idea; it 
would also amount to a convenient bridge to a yet more universal 
SOP.  
5. A SOP FOR PETER:  GLOBAL STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS 
Return now to those whose plight occasions the concern of this 
article, Section 2’s “Twos” and, especially, “Threes”—those who 
were also called “Peters.”  Might we not view their heightened 
labor income risk as a particularly poignant variation on the 
employment relation itself which ethically underwrites the ESOP, 
as discussed in Section 3?  Might one also view the income gains 
 
Liked the Slogan So Much. . ., http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1357091.stm (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2008) (describing the popular influence of powerful slogans). 
149 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56 
(1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000)).  For commentary on the 
Telecommunications Act and how it restructured telephone markets, see PETER W. 
HUBER ET AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 (1996); 74 AM. JUR. 2d 
Telecommunications § 16 (2001) (describing the Telecommunications Act and how it 
restructured telephone markets). 
150 See 47 U.S.C. § 336(a) (2000) (“[T]he Commission . . . (1) should limit the 
initial eligibility for such licenses [for use of advanced spectrum] to persons 
that . . . are licensed to operate a television broadcast station or hold a permit to 
construct such a station . . . and (2) shall adopt regulations that allow the holders 
of such licenses to offer such ancillary or supplementary services on designated 
frequencies as may be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity.”).  For a discussion of the FCC’s grant of a free spectrum for HDTV 
under the Act,  see Matthew Spitzer, Dean Krattenmaker’s Road Not Taken: The 
Political Economy of Broadcasting in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. 
REV. 353, 365–67 (1996). 
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realized by “Ones” through globalization as a species of rent as 
discussed in Section 4?  Certainly. 
Consider the following:  supposing per hypothesis, that “Peter” 
truly is “faultlessly disemployed” in consequence of global trade 
and investment liberalization because a more desperate “Paul” can 
work for less.  Also suppose that “Peter” is aging, and hence is 
truly unable to sufficiently “retool” himself to recover all of his lost 
income through new forms of employment.  When these 
suppositions are borne out, “Peter” bears a particularly poignant, 
and indeed ethically salient, relation to his erstwhile employer.151  
The employer, and hence the “Marys” who own the employing 
firm, have shed him precisely in order to capture the surplus that is 
generated by paying less in the form of wages and regulatory 
compliance to the more desperate “Pauls.”  “Peter’s” labor 
patronage in this case has effectively been replaced with a sort of 
“shadow,” or “ghost” labor patronage: His erstwhile relation 
extinguished, “Peter” is accordingly harmed by no fault of his 
own. 
Now note that “Mary,” for her part, is no more ethically 
creditable than “Peter” is faultable.  Mary has simply inherited a 
goodly portion of the firm-shares that she owns, or of the wealth 
she had expended to purchase them. The capital gains that will 
now accrue to those shares in consequence of global trade and 
investment liberalization are no more the result of her value-
adding effort than were those that accrued to her by dint of her 
being born into wealth.  They are the consequence of changes in 
the global legal environment, with which most “Marys” had 
nothing to do.  Or perhaps the capital gains are a consequence of 
undue influence that “Marys” exercised upon legislators to enact 
precisely so they could circumvent hard-won salary and labor 
standards.152  From “Marys’” perspective, therefore, they are 
windfalls at best, ill-gotten gains at worst.  They are rents flowing 
her way, by virtue of little more than her exclusive possession of 
 
151 I discuss such “retooling” costs, along with other determinants of  
“Peter’s” faultlessness, at length in Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra 
headnote; Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra headnote; Hockett, What Kinds of 
Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be?, supra headnote. 
152  I do not think the more sinister characterization is true of the vast 
majority of “Marys.”  But there seems to be some truth in the characterization 
insofar as it has made of some Marys with friends in today’s Washington, D.C., for 
example.  One need only consider the 1996 Telecommunications Act noted above 
at Section 4 to get the idea (describing how lobbying can influence legislation). 
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that which was given to her at birth.  Ethically, they are at best on 
all fours with mineral deposits or petroleum reserves discovered 
beneath her inherited real estate holdings, at worst the proceeds of 
venal lobbying activity.153 
 
If these considerations are in order, then do not society’s core 
values—its opportunity-egalitarian sense of justice as elaborated 
above at Sections 2 and 3.3—suggest we view “Mary” as properly 
bound to share some of her globalization-wrought, windfall gains 
with “Peter”?  And would not “Mary,” in turn, as well as everyone 
per our endowment dispositions discussed in Section 3.3, view the 
most readily palatable means of facilitating that gain-sharing as that 
involving the issuance of new shares, by the globalization-
benefiting and “Peter”-disemploying firms, to “Peter”?  Of course, 
that will dilute the value of “Mary’s” shares in the firm.  This is, 
however, simply another way of saying that it will amount to 
“Mary’s” sharing her globalization-wrought gains with those 
“Peters” who have been laid off by her globalization-benefitting 
firms.  And as noted above at Section 3.3, sharing of this sort is 
much less likely to be experienced as “taking” and “redistributing” 
than as “taxing and spending.” 
How, then, would a SOP configured in conformity with these 
observations be structured?  In light of the sample SOP-variants 
described in Section 4, it is possible to describe potential models.  
The next subsections detail two such renditions—the first narrowly 
tailored, the second a bit more ambitious. 
5.1. Compensating Lost Labor Patronage:  Outsource Stock Ownership 
Plans 
Think of the first, more narrowly tailored rendition simply as a 
straightforward variation on the Rent-SOP.  Treat new access to 
global intermediate product, capital, and labor markets as the 
“resource.”  Treat those who are “disemployed” by firms accessing 
those newly opened markets as the natural constituents—
analogues to the “citizens of Alaska” countenanced above in 
Section 4.2.  One could also presumably employ the same means 
used to ascertain that “Peter” was disemployed owing to trade 
liberalization, and thus an appropriate beneficiary, to presently 
determine whether employees hard hit by trade liberalization are 
 
153  Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
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entitled to “adjustment relief.”154 
Let years of employment with such firms serve as degrees of 
patronage—an ethical-intuitively attractive suggestion from “two 
angles,” in this case.  It is not only true that more years laboring for 
the laying-off firm render the patronage relation appreciably 
“thicker” or “deeper.”  This is something akin to the “loyalty” 
interpreted as ethically salient patronage in connection with 
CuSOPs in Section 4.1.  It is also the case that by laboring for more 
years for the laying-off firm, “Peter” has less time to “retool” and 
find new employment. 
One must also consider that “Peter” is not “disemployed” only 
to the benefit of compatriot “Marys” owning compatriot firms.  
After all, “Peter’s” firm might not simply “outsource” “Peter’”s 
labor.  It might go out of business due to competition from foreign 
firms.  Of course, those firms are held largely by foreign “Marys”—
indeed, in many cases even foreign governments.155  Moreover, 
since global investment has been liberalized at least as surely as—
indeed, even more surely than—trade,156 even domestic “Mary” for 
her part is likely unharmed.  If well advised by investment 
consultants, she has long since dumped shares in “Peter’s” 
employer for shares in other firms altogether—both domestic and, 
increasingly, foreign.157 
But if this is true, and the goal is to ensure that the “Marys” 
share gains quite generally with “Peters,” then the spreading of 
new shares in “disemploying” firms to their erstwhile, now laid 
off, employees simply will not suffice.  How to do that?  In order to 
diversify the holdings of “Peters” to render their capital incomes 
more secure and plug all other leaks, it is necessary to link “Peters” 
to “Marys” via more firms than one. 
There are a number of options for establishing such links, no 
single one of which must be exclusive.  One should accordingly 
resist the temptation to try to blueprint in detail every such 
possible means.  Instead, consider simply what seems like a 
suggestive and promising multi-step general strategy:  begin with 
 
154 See Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 107–210 
§116, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) (providing aid to 
workers adversely affected by increased importation). 
155 China, for example, and other governments control domestic enterprises 
by maintaining majority stakes there in. 
156 See Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote. 
157 Id. 
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healthy, continuing domestic firms that “outsource” their labor, 
because the patronage link between such firms and “Peters” is 
particularly ethically salient and heuristically compelling. 
Structure the plan, which will be called an “OutsourceSOP,” like 
the RentSOP discussed in Section 4.2: 
 
FIGURE 4:  INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF AN 
OUTSOURCESOP ARRANGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The structure here is basically the same as that of Figures 1, 2 
and 3 above, with “disemployed” laborers rather than ongoing 
employees, customers or “Alaskans” now standing in as our 
salient class of patrons.  The degree of patronage, however, will 
again track years of employment just as in the ESOP.  This is 
intuitively attractive both because the outsourced employee has 
invested more of his working life and “specific human capital” into 
the firm and, on the other hand, because the employee now has 
less to give to other prospective employers.  Other than this and 
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the changed patronage basis ethically grounding the public benefit, 
the only new wrinkle is simply that the benefits afforded to 
outsourcing firms by the public—in the form, inter alia, of 
negotiated trade and investment liberalization agreements—are 
conditioned upon share-spreading by the firms to their laid-off 
laborers.  The important point for present purposes is that, just as 
in the other SOP examples, the firm here finds itself debt-financing 
on favorable terms in the interest of boosting its capacity to exploit 
the newly exploitable resource.  For example, the firm has an 
interest in exploiting a newly opened set of global markets, and 
spreading ownership in itself—hence the benefits that accrue to its 
owners by dint of its access to those markets—in the process. 
But what of the foreign firms?  Will they not be more difficult 
to rope-in to the scheme than domestic firms?  Here things become 
a little more complicated, but not insurmountably so, once we 
think about it.  Indeed the principal “complication” is simply that 
there are multiple means of doing justice to “Peter.”  One means 
would be simply to tax “Marys” with large holdings in foreign 
firms, and use the proceeds to purchase shares in the same foreign 
firms, which would in turn be placed into SOP-styled “Peter 
accounts.”  A cognate and perhaps more attractive (because non-
taxing) means—though this would work more effectively with 
respect to primary issuances than to purchases on the secondary 
market—would be to condition investment liberalization (the 
continued absence of capital controls) upon foreign firms’ issuing a 
certain amount of new stock to such “Peter accounts” per 
increment of stock acquired by compatriot “Marys.” 
Of course, foreign firms might be expected to protest that 
investment in themselves by “Marys” would be rendered less 
attractive as a consequence of the taxing method, and thus would 
be illicitly disadvantaged relative to domestic investment.  If one 
were to develop a means of ensuring that it was only indeed 
“Marys” whom are being taxed—e.g., by taxing capital gains 
realized on foreign stock holdings only beyond some threshold—
however, this would simply amount to the unethical demand that 
“Marys” be permitted unjustly to benefit at the expense of innocent 
“Peters.”  Moreover, investments by “Marys” in firms that abide 
by labor, environmental, and other standards equivalent to those 
observed by domestic firms could be exempted.158 
 
158 Note that this is not the same thing as conditioning trade liberalization 
upon trading partners’ subjecting their firms to the same labor, environmental, 
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That of course raises the other, cognate prospect just 
mentioned, amounting to yet another means by which to improve 
the relative justice-standings of “Mary” and “Peter.”  Trade and 
investment liberalization could be conditioned upon all benefiting 
firms’ financing themselves at least in part through the SOP 
structure to enable all “Peters” to share in the gains realized by 
“Marys.”  That is to say, why not “go national” or indeed “global” 
with the full “OutsourceSOP” program itself? 
5.2. Going Transnational:  “Global Citizen” Stock Ownership Plans 
Pursue that last line of thought for a moment and connect it 
with the aforementioned matter of the “Marys” who disinvest from 
globalization-damaged, “Peter-disemploying” firms in order to 
reinvest not abroad, but in other domestic firms to whose 
production processes “Peter’s” long-developed firm- or sector-
specific human capital is not suited.  Link it up also to the yet 
larger matter of income security and its relation to investment 
diversification more generally.  Might it be possible to develop 
either a national or, more ambitiously, multinational compact 
pursuant to which all “Peters” nationwide or indeed worldwide 
benefit through something like the SOP structure in return for their 
“playing by the rules,” or perhaps affording some other form of 
national or international service?  This might ring a bit grandiose at 
present, but please bear with the idea at least for a moment. 
It seems plausible to suggest that citizenship itself is a kind of 
patronage, even if it is “thinner” than most other forms.  It is an 
ongoing relation that can warrant, in some cases, the public 
conferral of at least some kinds of benefit.  At any rate “good 
citizenship” would seem so, such that everyone who “plays by the 
rules,” “works hard,” or perhaps provides some kind of ongoing 
public service can be said to deserve some solicitude, perhaps even 
the guarantee of some “basic minimum” from society at large. 
Most people, surely feel that they owe a “hand up” to those 
who share our core values, obey our laws, seek useful 
 
and other regulatory standards as those to which domestic firms are subjected.  It 
is only to require that “Marys” who exploit such differentials share the gains that 
they realize with the “Peters.”  Lest you worry that the effect will nevertheless be 
the same, differing only in degree rather than kind by dint of the “Marys”  then 
turning to invest more in domestic firms that also do not employ “Peter,” please 
read on.  That is the loophole that I intend to close next. 
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employment, and are nonetheless “down” by the workings of 
fortune, not fault.  That seems to be what our oft invoked 
commitments to equal justice, worth, and dignity commit us to, at 
the very least.  And those commitments all jointly add up, not to a 
guaranteed equality of citizens’ ultimate outcomes, of course, since  
 
 
 
outcomes impound efforts as well as opportunities, but at least to 
equality of real opportunity as suggested above in the Introduction 
and Sections 2 and 3.3.159 
Surely few will disagree with these truths, which not only 
Americans seem to hold “self-evident.”160  What people do 
sometimes disagree about are the empirics of actual 
responsibility—the comparative degrees to which chance and 
choice have determined particular citizens’ particular outcomes.  
Practical means of disentangling these intermingling “inputs” to 
citizens’ “wealth functions” are proposed elsewhere.161  For present 
purposes it will do simply to recall what was discussed above at 
Section 3.3.  In summary, Section 3.3 proposed that (a) the more 
innocent a prospective beneficiary of a share-spreading program, 
the less well-endowed that beneficiary already is, and (b) the more 
readily viewed as an ethically exogenous resource or material 
opportunity a spread item is, the easier it is to perceive publicly 
augmented spreading as a redress of ill-fortune.  It is easier in such 
cases to view public action as vindicating equal opportunity rather 
than simply doling handouts.  This is even truer when public 
augmentation takes the form of tax breaks.162 
In this light, one could describe a more generalized variation 
on the ESOP, this one geared toward benefiting those in particular 
 
159 See, e.g., sources cited supra headnote.  See also Section 3.3., supra (noting 
the universality of equality norms). 
160 See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote at 29–56.  That is where I 
endeavor to locate an overlapping consensus among our dominant political 
traditions—a consensus that converges upon a shared ideal I label that of an 
“efficient equal-opportunity republic.”  See also Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, 
supra headnote at 142–73 (linking the concepts justice and efficiency); see generally 
Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 10.  The “self-evidence” 
remark, of course, alludes to Thomas Jefferson, A Declaration by the Representatives 
of the United States of America, in General Congress Assembled, July 4, 1776, in 
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 19 (Merril D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
161 See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote at 36–51. 
162 See supra Section III.C. 
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who are young, lacking in resources, or good citizens who play by 
the rules.  One could begin by targeting those who benefit their 
country or the global polity through something akin to the United 
States’ AmeriCorps services.  One could even think about 
instituting, perhaps through the U.N., the World Bank, or some 
coalition of such institutions, something like a “WorldCorps.”163  
Government could readily ensure that beneficiaries meet these 
criteria—criteria which will reflect and define the form of 
patronage that people believe ethically to underwrite the benefit.164  
And one could financially structure the arrangement so as to 
ensure that beneficiaries benefit only by working. 
Here is how:  first, establish a national or multinational trust, a 
sort of cross between various nations’ national pension trusts and 
the humbler ESOP trust schematized at Section 3.  Such a trust 
might be called, for example, the national or international “Citizen 
Stock Ownership Plan” or “CitSOP” Trust.  Second, open 
individual “citizen trusts” or “accounts” for every citizen—
perhaps upon each citizen’s reaching adulthood (in the “accounts” 
case), or at birth (in the “trusts” case) as has recently been done in 
the U.K.165  These individual CitSOP accounts could be 
administered as was envisaged in connection with the “USA” 
accounts proposed in the late 1990s by President Clinton, or the 
Social Security “personal accounts” proposed somewhat more 
recently, or even the accounts proposed by the IMF’s own co-
designer, Lord Keynes, nearly 70 years ago.166 
 
163 The United States’ first large-scale post-Homesteading era education-
spreading—hence, “human capital” spreading—programs began with veterans as 
beneficiaries.  Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra headnote at 144–46.  It would be 
fitting to recognize other forms of service in similar ways. 
164 Note that we do this already with federal home finance and higher 
education assistance.  We employ both financial need criteria and law-abidingness 
criteria.  See id. at 97. 
165 I refer to Prime Minister Blair’s Child Trust Fund—or more popularly, 
“baby bonds”—a plan implemented in 2001.  See Blair Banks On Baby Savings 
Scheme, BBC NEWS,  Apr. 27, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics 
/1297324.stm.  Former Senator Bob Kerrey of Nebraska proposed something 
similar in the United States at the turn of the past century.  His were called 
“KidSave Accounts.”  See Idea of the Week: KidSave, DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP 
COUNCIL, Oct. 13, 2000, http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=2372&kaid 
=131&subid=207. 
166 President Clinton proposed “universal savings accounts,” or “USAs,” in 
1999.  A similar structure of private accounts, now without government income 
support, figured into George W. Bush’s 2005 “State of the Union” address.  See 
generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, HOW TO PAY FOR THE WAR (1940) (describing 
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Let the national or multinational CitSOP trust borrow from 
lending institutions just as firms’ ESOP trusts do, and let them use 
the proceeds of the loans to purchase newly issued, dividend-
yielding common stock from firms.  Grant participating firms and 
lending institutions, in turn, more or less the same tax incentives as 
they are afforded in connection with US ESOP arrangements.  Let 
the national or international CitSOP trusts, in turn, pledge the 
purchased stock as collateral167 and steadily pay down the debts to 
the lenders out of, say, the tax revenue brought in from 
participating firms.  Let the full set of arrangements, in short, look 
something like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keynes’s visionary and, as it turned out, prophetic proposal); President Clinton 
Introduces Universal Savings Accounts, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, Apr. 16, 
1999, , available at http://www.ici.org/issues/ret/arc-leg/99_pres_usas.html; 
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Clinton 
Announces USA Accounts, (Apr. 14, 1999), available at  http://clinton4.nara.gov 
/WH/New/html/19990414-3020.html; Pamela Perun, Matching Private Savings 
with Federal Dollars, URBAN INSTITUTE, Nov. 1, 1999, http://www.urban.org 
/publications/309272.html (evaluating the effectiveness of Clinton’s USA 
Account proposals); RON GEBHARDTSBAUER, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF  ACTUARIES, 
USA ACCOUNTS, http://www.actuary.org/pdf/pension/usaccounts.pdf 
(reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of the Universal Savings Accounts); 
WhiteHouse.gov, Strengthening Social Security for Future Generations, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security (affirming the importance 
of reforming Social Security); Bush Pushes Private Accounts, CBS NEWS,  May 4, 2005, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/04/politics/main692991.shtml?sour
ce=search_story (advocating the idea that private investment accounts created 
from Social Security payroll taxes is the best approach).  On Keynes’s role in 
designing the Fund, see, for example, Hockett, Mission Creep, supra headnote. 
167 Though, of course, this also might be deemed unnecessary in the United 
States in view of the full faith and credit enjoyed by a federal institution.  Indeed, 
even were the trust to function as a government sponsored entity (“GSE”), it 
would in effect be viewed as being fully 80% as credit-worthy as the federal 
government itself for purposes of bank capital adequacy regulation.  See Risk-
Based Capital Guidelines, 12 C.F.R. pt.3 app. A (2008).   
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FIGURE 5:  INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A CITSOP 
ARRANGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
This diagram mirrors Figure 1 (or 2 or 3 or 4) again, with some 
differing persons and entities—apart from issuing firms and 
lenders—involved, in light of the distinct form of patronage being 
rewarded.  The only complications found here and not in the 
previous figures (in the ESOP, CuSOP, RentSOP and 
OutsourceSOP cases) concern how precisely the salient patronage 
form is to be defined.  For example, if one begins with national or 
multinational service of some sort as the salient patronage form, 
then the amount of stock released over time to the individual 
beneficiary’s CitSOP account will track her tenure of service.  If, on 
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the other hand, law-abiding citizenship itself is the patronage 
category, then stock amounts will rise simply with years of 
citizenship—just as one’s U.S. Social Security or cognate national 
pension benefit elsewhere (for example, Chile168) rises with time 
spent at work. 
One might also stratify patronage subtypes in this case, such 
that law-abiding citizenship alone entitles the beneficiary to some 
basic minimum of stock released per quarter, national or 
international service of one sort entitles her to some amount more, 
national or international service of another sort entitles her to a yet 
larger increment more, and so on.  Finally, insofar as opportunity 
deficits are of concern, one might “needs test” one or more of the 
benefits here, perhaps applying a graduated discount factor to 
entitled benefits as personal wealth rises.169  One would then 
consider “disemployment” by an “outsourcing” firm itself to 
constitute such a need, in effect growing the CitSOP directly out of 
the OutsourceSOP.  In such a case, one would presumably verify 
eligibility by means similar to those employed presently in 
connection with statutory “adjustment relief.”170 
There are many variations and gradations to consider and 
evaluate, as the aim here is to establish the plausibility and 
attractiveness of the general idea rather than to lock into one 
particular blueprint.  The important points for present purposes, 
then, are more fundamental in nature:  The first is that the basic 
model can perspicuously accommodate any form of patronage—
any form of ethically deserving status such as might politically 
sanction benefit conferral—that can be envisaged.  The second 
point is that it can do so while conferring benefits in a manner that 
both (a) spreads firm ownership, and (b) does so by means that 
respect both people’s core values and their endowment sensibilities 
as rehearsed above in Section 3.3. 
 
168 For a good sampling of the aims, ambitions and operations of various 
national pension programs, see, for example, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSIONS: 
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE  (Salvador Valdes-Prieto ed., 
1997) 
169 A limiting case, then, might be that of the offspring of wealthy families, 
who perhaps would not qualify for any benefit of this particular (CitSOP) sort.  It 
might, however, on the other hand be deemed preferable not to “needs test” at all, 
on more or less the same political popularity grounds as ground the U.S. 
Supplemental Security Income’s abstention from needs testing. 
170 See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing adjustment relief 
through taxation). 
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The third point is that trade and investment liberalization may 
be conditioned upon participation by other nations in multilateral 
programs which require only well-to-do “Marys,” not erstwhile 
penurious “Pauls,” to share the surpluses they derive from 
globalizations with recently and faultlessly “outsourced” “Peters.”  
Continued globalization could thus be conditioned upon everyone 
gaining. 
And finally the fourth point, which will be treated more 
thoroughly in the following subsection, is that the national or 
international CitSOP idea fans out naturally into a broader 
consideration that deserves a bit more discussion:  the fact that the 
“Peters” who elicit our concern, possessing as they generally do 
only one, comparatively undiversifiable form of capital—”human 
capital”—are inherently subject to more income risk than are the 
“Marys,” whose firm-share-holdings are readily diversified.  Might 
we work to render our compensated “Peter’s” new capital form as 
secure as “Mary’s”? 
5.3. Addressing the Risks of Ownership:  Portfolio-Diversifying SOP 
Mutuals 
One particular advantage enjoyed by the CitSOP idea that is 
not enjoyed to the same degree by the CuSOP, RentSOP and single 
firm OutsourceSOP ideas is the automaticity of the CitSOP’s 
diversification of acquired stocks.  If a broad variety of firms 
nationally or transnationally participate in the CitSOP program, 
beneficiaries could perforce receive shares in a broad array of 
firms.  In the earlier-rehearsed CuSOP, RentSOP and 
OutsourceSOP cases, by contrast, diversification would ride upon 
more accidental factors. These factors include, for example, the 
number of different corporate firms that the particular beneficiary 
regularly patronized as a customer (voluntarily, involuntarily or in 
between), the number of such rent-extracting firms in more or less 
close proximity to where the beneficiary lived, or the number of 
firms—typically only one—for which the beneficiary labored.  
How, then, might one design SOP-like or SOP-complementing 
arrangements that optimally diversify holdings among all SOP 
beneficiaries irrespective of SOP-type? 
Once again, a variety of methods might be employed.  
Consider two very simple, exemplary models.  The first model 
might appropriately be called the “SOP Mutual.”  Various SOP 
trusts would convey their primary issuer stock holdings to an 
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intermediary, which in return would convey shares in itself of 
equal value to the trusts.171  The intermediary (and now secondary 
issuer) would be, in effect, a mutual fund whose (initial) members 
were SOP trusts.172  Subsequently the SOP trusts would, rather 
than gradually releasing sponsoring issuers’ securities to their 
beneficiaries’ individual accounts over time, release SOP Mutual 
shares instead.  Shares of the latter sort also would serve, where 
shares collateralize loans used for the purchase of primary issuer 
stock, in place of the latter as collateral.  Diagramatically, then, 
things would look thus: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
171  See generally TOM COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND 
MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 131–297 (3d ed. 2000) (describing cash flow 
valuation).  Individual issuer shares would be valued as are any issuer’s—by “the 
market” in the case of publicly valued firms, pursuant to the “cashflow” method 
in the case of closely held firms.  Id.  I ignore here the question of means of 
avoiding imprecisions occasioned by market fluctuations, accounting 
indeterminacies, etc., as there seem to be no difficulties specific to the present case 
and not already dealt with by familiar means in other investment company 
contexts. 
172 This would also hold true for SOP trust beneficiaries. 
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FIGURE 6:  INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A SOP WITH 
SOP MUTUAL ARRANGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
It is worth noting here that the SOP Trusts participating in SOP 
Mutual arrangements could be of all types—ESOPs, CuSOPs, 
RentSOPs, OutsourceSOPs, even CitSOPs, were there good 
reason.173  And the more SOP types and SOPs, of course, the 
greater the degree of diversity, hence the lesser quantum of value 
at risk, that would be faced by SOP beneficiaries—or “Peters.”  
Such a hybrid approach would yield the “best of both worlds,” so  
 
 
173 For example, were an insufficient variety of firm types participating in 
CitSOP arrangements. 
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to speak.  It would both foster patronage relations between persons 
and firms—since benefits ride upon such relations—and dissipate 
the income-risk that attends patronage-concentration. 
An advantage of the SOP Mutual model is that it enables SOP 
beneficiaries—not to mention lenders whose loans are 
collateralized by SOP Trust-held stocks—to reap the benefits of 
diversification even before they become legal, as distinguished 
from beneficial, owners.  If, however, it became necessary to forgo 
that advantage for some reason, it would be possible to mutualize 
at the individual beneficiary level rather than at the SOP Trust 
level.  One might, for example, condition qualification for the SOP 
benefit upon the agreement of beneficiaries to diversify their 
holdings for some period of time.  Alternatively, one might tax 
gains differently upon individually owned primary issues and 
secondary (mutual) stock.  What seems more likely is a gradually 
growing degree of financial understanding enjoyed by citizens 
holding gradually growing portfolios of securities174 that 
presumably would prompt SOP beneficiaries to better diversify 
their legally owned holdings.  Government might even provide, 
facilitate, or otherwise encourage the provision of such counseling. 
In all events, diagrammatically things would look rather as 
they do in Figure 5, save that now arrows would link not SOP 
Trusts and SOP Mutuals, but individual SOP beneficiaries and 
ordinary mutual funds: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
174 We might even subsidize or require—the latter perhaps in the form of 
benefit conditionality— some baseline degree of financial counseling, as we do in 
the case of our federal home- and education-finance programs.  See Hockett, 
Jeffersonian Republic, supra headnote, at 112, 151 (comparing federal home and 
education financing assistance). 
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FIGURE 7:  INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A SOP WITH 
PRIVATELY ACHIEVED DIVERSIFICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
And one might imagine, of course, ordinary mutual funds 
serving both in their current capacities and as SOP Mutuals: 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8:  INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A SOP WITH 
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SOP MUTUAL ARRANGEMENT AND PRIVATELY ACHIEVED 
DIVERSIFICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
There seems no reason, then, why we might not achieve 
optimal diversification among our increasingly owning citizens 
even while rewarding their multiple ongoing patronage relations 
with a perhaps somewhat lesser variety of firms. 
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6.  A ROLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 
Everything described and discussed in Section 5 implicates 
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the “New 
International Financial Architecture” that they have been busily 
constructing since the mid-1940s.175  A possible problem at this 
juncture, however, is that it does not implicate them solely in one 
way.  What role or roles the IFIs should play—and indeed which 
IFIs should play a role—will rest largely on the structure and 
institutionalization of a system of OutsourceSOP arrangements, 
CitSOP arrangements, or both.  This Article has thus far repeatedly 
abstained from committing to any one way of proceeding with 
these arrangements, in view of its exploratory, “thought-
experimenting” nature. 
Perhaps the best way to think about the role of the IFIs in a 
manner that coheres with this Article’s purposes, then, is to divide 
the inquiry into two stages.  The first stage will note a few reasons 
of a general nature as to why and how the IFIs are implicated.  For 
what can be said here will both (a) be applicable to any particular 
role or set of roles envisaged for the IFIs, and (b) delimit how we 
can more specifically envisage those roles themselves.  In the 
second stage, this Article will sketch out the role of the IFIs a bit 
more specifically.  This paper, however, will aim to do so in broad 
enough outline as to remain appropriately open to the plurality of 
options presented by the “thought experimenting” done in Section 
5. 
6.1. How the IFIs are Constitutionally Implicated 
The proposals envisaged in Section 5 are all, at their most basic, 
financial in nature.  They are also designed with a view to better 
apportioning the benefits and burdens of globalization.  The 
central idea is to spread ethically exogenous benefits and burdens 
more equitably, in keeping with core opportunity-egalitarian 
values as laid out in Sections 2 and 3.3.  The aim is also to do so, in 
keeping with methods-constraining endowment dispositions as 
briefly rehearsed in Section 3.3, via the mechanisms through which 
 
175 More on this history infra, text accompanying notes 179–85.  See generally 
Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote; Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra 
headnote. 
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globalization-benefited business firms finance themselves.  By tax-
break-assisting corporate debt-finance in return for corporate 
share-spreading—which of course is financial capital-spreading—
or by conditioning firms’ receipt of rent-like benefits—such as 
those occasioned by globalization—upon share-spreading, the SOP 
plans do something that is just as financial as it is ethically and 
intuitively attractive: they harness finance and globalization 
themselves to spread globalization’s own financial benefits more 
widely.  The benefits themselves, to repeat, are as financial in 
nature as could be: they are corporate securities. 
Now precisely for these reasons, the suggestions made in 
Section 5 fall squarely within what I have argued in a number of 
other venues to comprise the emerging mandate of the principal 
IFIs—the Bretton Woods institutions in particular.176  What is 
meant by “emerging mandate” here?  Well, two things—one fairly 
broad, the other more narrow in sweep.  Broadly speaking, the 
IFIs’ legally mandated and pragmatically necessary role is to 
facilitate sustainable global economic integration.  More 
specifically, it is to do so from that integration process’s specifically 
financial nodes.177  This is, of course, a complex and evolving 
mandate, not least because global financial markets and practices 
themselves are both highly complex and now rapidly evolving.178 
Now this mandate originally involved the IMF in overseeing 
and maintaining the global currency regime upon which product 
market integration depended.179  It involved the IBRD in financing 
postwar reconstruction and new infrastructure development, both 
directly and indirectly.180  Since the 1970s, 1980s and, especially, the 
later 1990s, the mandate has steadily come to involve rather more 
for all of the IFIs.  And that has been largely in owing precisely to 
the IFIs’—and indeed globalization’s—successes in carrying out the 
mandates’ earlier stages.  
The Fund’s ongoing global financial market monitoring roles, 
as well as its comparatively recent domestic structural adjustments, 
have been steadily transforming it into a critical determinant of the 
 
176 See generally sources cited supra headnote, para. 2.  See also infra notes 177–
97. 
177 See generally Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180  “Indirectly” by effectively encouraging private lending in addition to 
supplying funds directly.  See id.; Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote. 
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legal and regulatory infrastructures not only of cross-border 
financial transactions, but unavoidably of domestic financial 
arrangements as well.181  The Bank, for its part, has come 
increasingly—and again, unavoidably—to treat domestic pension 
and social insurance arrangements as critical components of the 
infrastructures that must be formed for steady economic 
development.182 
All of these developments were, at least in broad outline, both 
foreseeable and indeed foreseen during the founding era of the IFIs 
in the mid-1940s.  Thus, they were legally provided for in the 
constitutive documents, acts, and shared understandings from 
which the institutions grew.183  The founders recognized, and 
actively sought, the gradual integration of world product and 
service markets.  They promoted this integration in the interests of 
greater prosperity among, and closer integration between national 
societies themselves.184  Accordingly, they also saw the need for a 
pragmatically adjustable role for international collaboration in the 
realms of finance and its regulation, partly because financial 
services themselves engage in trade.  More importantly, finance, 
financial markets, and financial products are critically 
determinative of the operation, integration, and stable sustainable 
growth of markets generally.185 
Now it would seem that the prospects considered just above in 
Section 5 fall quite squarely within this same province, both as a 
prudential and as an ethical matter.  Prudentially speaking, and as 
noted in Section 1, global trade and investment liberalization 
 
181 See Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote, at 156–57 (detailing how and 
why the International Monetary Fund has moved from focusing solely on strictly 
macro-economic concerns to also involving issues such as domestic bankruptcy 
laws, corporate policies, and political governance); see also Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, 
supra headnote (illustrating potential ways that IFIs could benefit individuals 
instead of just macro-economic actors). 
182 See Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote, at 191 (noting changes in the 
Bank’s system of assessment of necessary economic infrastructure); see also 
Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote, at 121 (supporting the IMF and the Bank in 
their recognition of effective social-insurance programs following the Asian 
Financial Crisis and the Argentine meltdown). 
183 See Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote, at 177–89 (analyzing the 
IMF’s Articles of Agreement). 
184 Id. at 162 (describing how “relations between aggregate wealth, trade, and 
money” gave rise to IFIs). 
185 See generally Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote (suggesting that the 
IMF’s focus on domestic markets is actually in line with the founders’ original 
goals). 
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appear to have entered more turbulent political waters in the last 
decade or so.  The process’s perceived “losers” have been growing 
more numerous, more vocal, or both.  And it seems they are 
beginning to be heard and heeded—not just by activists and 
agitators, but by leaders and legislators as well.  If the process of 
global economic integration is to continue, and we are to avoid 
backsliding into a 1930s-style retrenchment, then we should 
increase the number of stakeholders among those who are growing 
both more disenfranchised and more disenchanted. 
Sections 3 through 5 suggest that one ethically attractive and 
intuitively satisfying means of making more stakeholders is 
creating more shareholders within the very firms that now benefit 
by globalization.  This kind of stake is of course financial, in that 
shares are financial assets and the proposed means for spreading 
these shares are financial as well.  So both in respect of ends—
sustaining continued global market integration by better spreading 
its financial benefits—and in respect of financial engineering 
means—the proposals above clearly implicate the IFIs’ developing 
mandates. Generally, this is what is meant by asserting that the IFIs 
are implicated by this Article’s proposals. 
What is meant specifically?  As argued elsewhere, the proper 
roles of the IFIs in facilitating sustainable global economic 
integration can be helpfully schematized as falling within any of 
four quadrants formed by two axes.186  The first axis runs between 
so-called “programs” and “policies.”  This divide is rooted in the 
structures of the IFIs’ enabling treaties themselves.  It principally 
involves the IFIs in developing “policies” to encourage and 
facilitate particular kinds of member state “programs.”187 
The second axis runs between what are well individuated as 
“opportunity” and “risk.”  These amount to the financial faces of 
globalization’s aforementioned “benefits” and “burdens,” 
respectively.188  This axis is rooted, not in the IFIs’ enabling treaties, 
but simply in the functional roles played by finance in human 
affairs.189  And the IFIs’ mandates are best interpreted as charges to 
 
186 See generally Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote (suggesting ways that 
IFIs could benefit individuals instead of just macro-economic actors). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 On the benefit side, finance amounts to opportunity in the quite literal 
sense that it enables people, through the exercise of diligence, to “make real” their 
potentially value-adding ideas.  In effect, this is precisely what micro-loans, small 
business loans, corporate finance, and venture capital finance all amount to.  On 
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the IFIs to adopt policies encouraging and facilitating state 
programs that not only increase opportunity and decrease risk, but 
that also work specifically to spread what this Article has called 
“ethically exogenous” opportunity and risk.190 
The program/policy and opportunity/risk axes form four 
quadrants according to which many opportunity and risk 
spreading state programs, encouraged and facilitated by specific 
IFI policies, can be classified.191  For example, land reform, basic 
health, literacy, and education programs carried out within states 
are, of course, ethically exogenous opportunity-spreading 
programs.  The Bank in particular has developed policies in favor 
of encouraging and indeed facilitating such programs.192  The 
Fund’s and the Bank’s developing interests in eradicating 
corruption and even in fostering democracy, both in governments 
and in corporate governance, can likewise be so interpreted.193  
Social insurance programs run by states amount to ethically 
exogenous risk-spreading programs.  And the IFIs’ recent 
attentions to “social safety nets” amount to IFI policy 
developments along these lines.194  Additional market-based 
programs are proposed in other venues.195 
 
 
the burden side, finance amounts to a means of trading, sharing, or more thinly 
spreading what would otherwise be thickly concentrated risk.  This, of course, is 
one reason why insurance companies are considered to be financial institutions.  It 
is also, of course, quite clearly observed not only in derivative and other hedging 
markets, but even in the more garden variety corporate securities markets 
themselves, a principal role of which is to assist firms’ owners in diversifying their 
investments and thus lessening their financial risks.  See generally ROBERT 
HOCKETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FINANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (forthcoming 2008). 
190 See Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote, at 193 (suggesting that IFIs 
could work to achieve global distributive justice by harnessing international 
financial markets); Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote (supporting the IMF and 
the Bank in their recognition of effective social-insurance programs following the 
Asian financial crisis and the Argentine meltdown). 
191 Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote.  See also Hockett, Global Macro-
Hedging, supra headnote (arguing that profit distribution remains inequitable 
despite increasing globalization, and suggesting and evaluating methods to 
change this); Robert Hockett, Gaming as Microinsurance (2008) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with author). 
192 See Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote, at 195 (describing the Bank’s 
facilitation of state programs for project development). 
193 Id. at 195–96. 
194 Id. 
195 See Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote. 
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Where do the SOP suggestions of Section 5 fit in?  To a degree, 
they straddle the boundaries, occupying portions of all four 
quadrants, which renders them especially good candidates for IFI 
concern.  It means they are cognizable by the IFIs from all vantage-
points of their mandates.  These observations are perhaps most 
obvious with respect to the opportunity/risk axis, where the 
straddle is conceptually inevitable (this will be shown in a 
moment).  On the other hand, with respect to the program/policy 
axis, the straddle is specifically contingent upon the pending 
decision after Section 5 as to how things should proceed.  
Accordingly, it is best to briefly review the opportunity/risk axis, 
leaving the matter of program and policy to a fuller consideration 
in Section 6.2. 
An opportunity and risk straddle in the case of the SOP plans 
of Section 5 means that spreading shares in globalization-benefited 
firms to faultless outsourced “Peters” includes both ethically 
exogenous risk and ethically exogenous opportunity.  Peter no 
longer needs to bear this risk—which is, again, by hypothesis 
ethically exogenous196—alone.  The risk to people like Peter—who 
might, when too old fully to retool, unforeseeably lose income in 
consequence of sudden hiring of desperate “Pauls” who can work 
for much lower pay in much poorer countries with much lower 
costs of living—is now mitigated.  It is mitigated by compensation 
paid to Peter by Mary, who has benefited by luck and must share 
some of her windfall gains.  So the presently concentrated burdens 
wrought by globalization are diluted and spread out, as are the 
concentrated windfall gains gleaned by Mary. 
The aforementioned benefit spreading, which here takes the 
form of share spreading, also amounts to a form of ethically 
exogenous opportunity spreading.  It is opportunity-spreading in 
the straightforward sense that to own shares in firms which benefit 
by globalization is to own shares in future profits.  “Peters” will 
glean future dividends, capital gains, or both, which they would 
not have gleaned before.  They might even use some of these to 
finance “retooling” of themselves through vocational training, if 
they are young enough to be able to employ the new skills.  Share-
spreading of this sort also is ethically exogenous opportunity- 
 
 
 
 196   That is what we mean in calling him “faultless.”  See supra, Sections 2, 3.3. 
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spreading.  It is so in the straightforward sense that it is financed, 
in effect, by recouping some of the windfall gains gleaned by the 
“Marys.” 
The SOP structures described in Section 5 facilitate the sharing 
of ethically exogenous opportunity and risk across persons in a 
manner that both increases the number of stakeholders in, and 
decreases the injustices wrought by, global economic integration.  
It is precisely the sort of mission shown elsewhere to fall well 
within the bailiwick of proper IFI concern.197 
But now, what form of IFI concern?  How is the concern to be 
manifest?  Are the SOP arrangements described in Section 5 best 
viewed as a state “program,” which IFIs should adopt “policies” to 
encourage and perhaps facilitate?  Or are we instead considering 
the sort of program that either must, or should, be administered by 
some transnational institution or institutions, including one or 
more of the IFIs?  That question requires consideration of precisely 
what role the IFIs are apt to play in any global SOPs program.  It is 
tempting to suggest that “path dependence,” determined in part by 
already existent analogical precedent and in part by an already 
developing institutional backdrop, is fitting to play an influential 
role. 
6.2. How IFIs are Programmatically Implicated 
 There seems no question that the IFIs both (a) have good 
reason, and (b) are authorized, to take interest in the prospect of a 
global SOPs program.  Hence the principal remaining question is 
what form that interest should take.  Given the particular interests 
at stake and the institutional environment already in place, it 
seems likely that the principal role for the IFIs will be:  first, 
inventive and advocative; second, coordinative; and third, 
monitory.  The remainder of this Section will explain these roles 
and their likelihood.  However, in keeping with the more 
“thought-experimenting” aims of this Article, the prospect that IFI 
involvement might take some other shape should be left open. 
First, then, the IFIs should undertake to design, and urge their 
members domestically to initiate OutsourceSOPs and perhaps even 
CitSOPs as well.  Second, they should propose, host, and facilitate 
international cooperation in coordinating SOP policies across 
 
197 See generally Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote; Hockett, Three Pillars, 
supra headnote. 
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jurisdictions in a manner encouraging safe participation and 
diversification of holdings by SOP beneficiaries.  Third, the IFIs 
should add, to their already active surveillance agendas, the 
regulation and monitoring of SOP trusts.  They should do this with 
a view to protecting beneficiaries and third parties from familiar 
forms of exploitation and expropriation by opportunistic 
fiduciaries, pursuant to their now accustomed role in facilitating 
coordinated finance-regulatory policies worldwide. 
In employing ordinal—”first,” “second,” “third”—terminology 
here, the aim is to convey not just expository ordering, but also 
literal programmatically temporal ordering.  The order of 
exposition is not only heuristically natural, but also replicates the 
optimal sequencing of IFI involvement in any global SOP’s agenda. 
But why should the IFIs design or advocate here at all?  Do 
individual member states—particularly those with substantial 
populations of “Peters”—not already face sufficient incentives to 
institute systems of OutsourceSOPs and even CitSOPs?  After all, 
their “Peters” are unjustly deprived of work opportunities by 
outsourcing, made possible by their treaties.  It is their function to 
facilitate exogenous opportunity and risk sharing among their own 
citizens.  What need is there for the IFIs to “incentivize,” then? 
Furthermore, are states, in addition to being already 
adequately incentivized, also capable of implementing SOP 
programs on their own, state by state?  States themselves must 
encourage SOP financing on the part of firms by trimming their tax 
take from firms that do so, or by conditioning trade liberalization 
on share issuance to outsourced employees as described in Section 
5.  Moreover, it is presumably states that will have to determine 
what citizens qualify for the benefit, as is currently the case with 
more familiar adjustment assistance.198  Finally, there is already an 
extensive infrastructure of bank trust departments and investment 
companies—mutual funds in particular—that seem most likely to 
supply the SOP-requisite trust accounts,199 and these operate under 
domestic regulatory arrangements. 
The reply to all of these questions and observations is, of 
course, yes.  States’ preexisting incentives and capabilities to 
implement their own SOP programs are helpful because that 
means that they can begin designing and instituting such programs 
 
198 See supra note 141, and accompanying text. 
199 We are not apt to wish to “reinvent the wheel” here. 
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as these to render globalization more unambiguously good for 
their citizenries, without having to wait for others to do so.200  
Furthermore, states will play a critical role, per familiar principles 
of subsidiarity, even in any eventual global SOPs infrastructure.201  
Nevertheless, complications arise which militate in favor of IFI 
entry. 
Most simply and generally, it will be much better for the cause 
of sustainable globalization for all states with sizable populations of 
“Peters” to design and institute SOP-type arrangements of the kind 
sketched above in Section 5.  That is so both for the justice- and 
prudence-based reasons laid out in Sections 2 and 3.3, and for the 
more globalization-specific reasons discussed above in Section 6.1.  
“More” is straightforwardly “better.”202  Additionally, the IFIs, 
whose first mission is to facilitate precisely such continued 
globalization, bear a natural interest in encouraging members to do 
domestically what is necessary to further that transnational 
purpose.  This is precisely why they encourage, as noted above in 
6.1, the development of “social safety nets” such as OutsourceSOP 
and CitSOP. 
Furthermore, within some polities, “Marys” might be as 
influential as “Peters,” if not more so.  Their perceived self-
interests might not in all cases be “enlightened.”  Moreover, many 
“Peters” in many jurisdictions might believe that their only remedy 
from continued outsourcing is to push back against globalization 
itself.  They might not realize that there are more direct and more 
carefully tailored, less globalization-threatening means of 
addressing their justified complaints that don’t “throw the baby 
out with the bathwater.” 
Accordingly, while the IFIs set or influence the agenda within 
polities where “everyone gains,” the Section 5 SOP solution has not 
yet been achieved or gone mainstream.  But by adding a salutary 
voice within polities, and moreover, by adding an impartial, 
transnational voice, the IFIs can play a critical role in the 
 
200 Hence my proposals in Hockett, Of ESOPs, supra headnote at 885–97 
(arguing that an ESOP is a “tentative, but incomplete” step towards disseminating 
the benefits of globalization to all citizens). 
201 Id. 
202 See generally Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote (detailing 
“straightforward betterness”); Robert Hockett, Market Completeness, Market 
Neutrality, and Ethically Cognizable Efficiency: An Ordinal Equivalence Theorem 
(2008) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (formalizing the proof of this 
claim). 
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popularizing and spreading of SOP programs worldwide.  Again, 
that in turn will facilitate the stable and steady continuance of 
equitably distributed market-integration to which the IFIs are, so to 
speak, constitutionally committed.203 
It also bears emphasis that some of the assumptions embedded 
in the questions introduced in the present discussion require more 
nuance to avoid being misleading.  And this takes us directly to the 
second role that the IFIs will likely play in connection with the 
instituting of any global SOPs program that moves beyond mere 
advocating. 
Here, then, is the proverbial rub:  national governments may 
encourage actual tax breaks or require conditional SOP-financing 
by firms.  They will also, in all likelihood, monitor beneficiary 
status claimants of SOP programs, with a view to those claimants’ 
bona fide “faultlessly outsourced” status.  Finally, there is already 
an extensive, privately provided infrastructure of bank trust 
departments and investment companies in place—an 
infrastructure apt to be utilized in the creation of SOP trust 
accounts and SOP beneficiary accounts.  But, owing to the success 
of IFI-facilitated global financial market integration itself, what 
individual states do vis-à-vis the financing of firms and the 
operating of financial intermediaries increasingly affects persons 
residing beyond their borders.204 
General Motors, Microsoft, and Unisys, for example, are not 
owned solely by American “Marys.”  Nor are Daimler, Phillips, or 
Unilever owned solely by Europeans, nor are Toyota and Sony 
exclusively owned by Japanese.  Firms increasingly offer and sell 
their shares worldwide.  Additionally, savings and investment 
portfolios increasingly are held across borders.205  This means, 
among other things, that what a particular state encourages or 
requires of firms under its jurisdiction increasingly affects non-
nationals as well as nationals. 
That in turn means that non-national “Marys” over whom a 
government lacks jurisdiction might feel differently than national 
 
203 That is to say, by their enabling treaties, whose mandates as enshrined in 
their constitutive documents. 
204 See, e.g., HAL SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 863–85 (13th ed., 2006) 
(evaluating the increased demand for international solutions in an increasingly 
dependent world). 
205 Id. at 17 (proving that cross-border savings and investment has increased 
dramatically). 
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“Marys” about having to share gains with national “Peters”—
especially if it is easier for national “Peters” to gain beneficiary 
status than the “Peters” in “Mary’s” own nation. It also means that 
nationally and non-nationally located firms can fare differently as 
“Marys” “vote with their feet” and move their investment moneys.  
Differential faring of this sort is inimical to the ideals of global 
market integration.  What is more, differences in treatment of 
primary-issuing firms and financial intermediaries nation-by-
nation discourage global diversification of holdings.  Such 
diversification is a necessary predicate to optimal asset security 
among the world’s shareholders. 
Presumably, we need not continue with this line of 
observations for present purposes.  The idea seems clear enough: 
for a global SOPs plan to be widely experienced, be appreciated as 
fair, and to work optimally, it will have to treat all global “Peters” 
and “Marys” as similarly and impartially as possible.  That means 
that there is a role for impartial international organizations to 
coordinate efforts among nations in order to harmonize 
substantive standards and procedural implementation.  Of course, 
this is yet another role that the IFIs—especially the IMF now—
already play.206 
Insofar as globalization is truly a global community project, 
and insofar as this project implicates something like a global SOPs 
program to smooth and thus underwrite the project’s continuance, 
it calls for coordinative assistance given such programs by the same 
institutions that assist in coordinating the other policies, programs 
and processes of global integration.  In the present context, that 
means the IFIs.  In addition to advocating the coordinated 
adoption of SOP programs by member states, and supporting the 
design and fine-tuning of such programs through their research 
and related expertise, the IFIs will do something else:  they will 
also constitute natural forums for coordinating, which includes the 
coordinating of substantive standards, implementary, and 
operational strategies, and the like.  With respect to the SOP form 
of global social insurance, they will do what they already do with 
respect to global finance—regulatory architecture.207  This takes us 
 
206 See generally Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote, at 105 (describing the 
IFIs’ role in balancing the concerns of equal treatment and market optimization). 
207 See generally Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote (detailing the 
interactions between social insurance and financial regulation); ROBERT HOCKETT, 
FINANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (forthcoming 2008). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/2
2008] GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER SOCIETY 179 
 
straight to the third and final “phase” of the most likely course of 
sequenced IFI involvement. 
Perhaps above all else, the kind of coordinating that many of 
the IFIs and especially the IMF do now is coordinating 
regulation.208  The financial services industry, as we have long 
known, is particularly vulnerable to occasional outbreaks of 
mutually reinforcing hyper-speculative and opportunistic behavior 
on the part both of fiduciaries and of others who trade on their 
own accounts.  At times, some of these people find the temptation 
to make a quick buck—typically through sophisticated means not 
readily detectable even by experienced regulators let alone 
uninformed, inexpert clients—difficult to resist.  When such things 
happen, not only can innocent parties’ life savings be wiped out 
with little more than a keystroke or two, but systemic third party 
effects can be devastating as well.209 
It is precisely because of the special vulnerability of inexpert 
clients, the systemic effects on the wider economy and thus 
uninvolved third parties, and the high money stakes that many 
traditionally anti-regulatory, politically “conservative” personages 
now recognize the need for at least financial regulation.210  Together 
with the need to coordinate regulatory strategies in a world whose 
financial markets are now integrated even while regulation 
remains national and polycentric, these reasons underwrite the role 
of the IFIs in researching, developing, and facilitating the smooth 
operation of the global finance-regulatory architecture. 
One can see where this is going:  A global SOPs program 
would make substantial shareholders of a vastly large number of 
people worldwide.  Firms worldwide will increasingly come to be 
owned, in varying amounts, by virtually all of the world’s adult 
inhabitants.  Their shares will be held and managed by financial 
intermediaries, which will accordingly hold power and face 
temptations of kinds quite familiar but on a scale vastly larger than 
before.  A global shareholder society will also be a global risk-
 
208 See generally Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote. 
209 For a particularly recent example, witness the current turmoil across 
financial markets generally rooted in the particular decisions of a few overeager 
subprime mortgage lenders several years ago.  Such examples can, of course, be 
proliferated from decade to decade. 
210 See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 577-78 (3rd ed., 
2003) (asserting that, even under the Reagan administration and its generally 
more anti-regulatory position, the SEC experienced a “staggering” increase its in 
workload). 
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bearing society:  a society of persons at risk of financial predation.  
To build such a society, in the end, is worth the risk, but only 
insofar as the risk can be mitigated along lines developed by 
domestic authorities over the past fifty years or so. 
The final role of the IFIs in connection with any global SOPs 
program will be a straightforward extension of—or rather, an 
augmentation of—what probably is their best known role.  In a 
world that increasingly comes to look like a global shareholder 
society—in which national citizens transnationally hold shares in 
transnational firms in accounts with transnationally operating 
financial intermediaries—the IFIs will have to assist national 
regulators in protecting their shareholder citizens, as well as the 
global financial system qua system.  When we get there, of course, 
things will look much as they do now, “only more so.” 
7.  CONCLUSION:  OUR COMING GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER SOCIETY 
A good bit of ground has been covered here, doubtless more 
than enough to warrant leaving off for the present.  Perhaps 
ironically, however, these issues have only begun to be addressed.  
For as mentioned a number of times already over the course of this 
Article, the aim has been more exploratory than flatly advocative. 
The processes of global market integration have been 
remarkably successful to date, particularly when measured against 
the backdrop of those world conditions that sent visionary world 
leaders like Maynard Keynes and Harry White, in the mid-1940s, 
upon the course ultimately taken.211  Those processes also have 
brought many benefits to many people, and continue to do so—
including not only many of the world’s hitherto most 
disadvantaged people, but also its most unjustly disadvantaged 
people. 
But global market integration is also occasioning losses—
including unjust losses.  Until we get serious about developing 
means to address these, the world is apt not only to remain less just 
than it could be, but also to fall prey to backsliding in the 
unsatisfactory direction from whence we have but recently come.212  
It seems clear that the best means of addressing these losses—
”best” as measured both against our motivating core ideals and 
 
  211 See Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote, at 165–68 (discussing the 
proposals of Keynes and White and the resulting Bretton Woods institutions). 
212 Two words come to mind here: “Smoot-Hawley.” 
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against our feasibility-constraining endowment sensibilities 
discussed above in Sections 2 and 3.3—are financial in nature. 
It also seems clear that, just as globalization is a global project, 
so is the project of rendering globalization more just and 
sustainable.  It is a project in which global institutions must play a 
critical role.  Because it is preeminently a financial project, it is a 
project in which our global financial institutions and global 
financial architecture in particular will play a critical role. 
The precise contours of these roles will ride in part upon the 
contours of the programs ultimately devised.  But I hope to have 
sketched out a plausible direction in which that devising might 
proceed.  By way of a last, parting thought for the moment, think 
of what it will mean should this succeed:  it will be the attainment 
of a goal that has long been the dream not only of internationalists, 
but even of more domestically oriented advocates of a just and 
sustainable economic order.  The foundations will be laid for a 
global society in which all members partake, as part-owners, of the 
means by which prosperity is generated.  There will be no more 
need of division between classes.  Nor will there be need of 
“protectionist” resurgences or Seattle-style riots.  “Globalization” 
will again be embraceable by idealists, not just by “offshoring” 
entrepreneurs in search of extractable surplus. 
Like it or not, everyone is a global stakeholder.  The idea of this 
Article is to make this inescapable stakeholding not only more 
bearable, but more just and indeed even fulfilling, by making 
everyone global shareholders as well. 
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